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IN 1'HE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiif-Resporulent,
v.

Ill

I
\

i

LOREN CRAIG SIMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

\

C.tse No.
12801

J

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was a criminal action brought by the
State of Utah against Defendant-Appellant,
Craig Sims, charging him w.th the crime of murder
in the 1st degree in violation of Section 76-30-3, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, under the clause
of that section referred to as the "felony murder rule."
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 13th day
1

of November, 1971, the jury found the DefendantAppellant guilty of murder in the lst degree and
recommended that he be imprisoned at hard labor for
life. On December 3, 1971, Defendant-Appellant was
sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor in the Utah
State Prison for life.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversing
the verdict and judgment rendered at trial and remanding the case to the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, for a new trial consistent with
the ruling of this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Trial of the Defendant for the crime of murder
in the lst degree under an information charging him
with violation of Section 76-30-3 commenced on November l, 1971, in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge, sitting with a
jury. After two days spent in impaneling a jury, the
State of Utah presented its case consisting of testimony
and evidence summarized as follows:
I. Mrs. Charlene Patterson, a resident of the Highland Apartments at approximately 3700 South on High-

land Drive in Salt Lake City, testified that she worked
as a nurse from 11 :00 p.m., to 7 :00 a.m., at the Latter-

Day Saints Hospital in Salt Lake City. She is the
mother of a young boy approximately seven years and
ha<l engaged the senices of one Linda Huntsman, a
student nurse at the L. D. S. Hospital, as an overnight babysitter. On the evening of March 22, 1971,
Miss Huntsman had arrived at her home in the company of Bryan Jessup, whom Mrs. Patterson
as Miss Huntsman's boy friend ('l'. 38), at approximately 10 :05 p.m. ( T. 44) . Craig Sims came to the
apartment to visit Mrs. Patterson while Miss Huntsman and Mr. Jessup were still there. While he was
there, Mrs. Patterson asked Mr. Sims to take her to
the hospital. She stated that while Sims was there they
discussed the fact that_ she had requested that Sims
bring her a hubcap for her car to replace one which
had been damaged by Miss Huntsman (T. 47) and
that she subsequently left Sims in the den while she
dressed for work. Sims and Mrs. Patterson left the
apartment after Mr. Jessup had apparently left; Miss
Huntsman and Gerald Patterson being the only two
persons remaining there. Sims drove Mrs. Patterson
to the L. D. S. Hospital at 8th Avenue and "C" Street.
She stated that she was sitting next to Sims in the
truck as they drove to the hospital and that, before
getting out of the truck, she kissed him. She arrived
on her floor at 11 :04 p.m.
The next morning at 7 :00 a.m., Mrs. Patterson
called home to ask Miss Huntsman to bring her glasses
when she came to pick her up at the hospital. The phone
rang several times before it was answered by her son,
3

Gerald. Mrs. Patterson asked whether Miss Huntsman
was awake, and Gerald, upon checking, said that she
was still asleep. Mrs. Patterson asked him to wake her
up. Gerald returned to the phone saying that she would
not wake up and that there was blood on her chin (T.
52. At this point, .Mrs. Patterson asked her supervisor,
Carla Hogan, to take her home. \Vhen they arrived at
the home, they tried the door which was locked and
rang the doorbell. The door was opened by Gerald.
Mrs. Patterson stated that she was afraid that something was wrong and that she refused to go into the
bedroom (T. 54).
2. Carla Hogan testified that, after being admitted

into the apartment by Gerald, Mrs. Patterson refused
to go past the living room, fearing that something
was the matter, and that she entered the bedroom of
Mrs. Patterson alone and found Miss Huntsman in
the bed, with the covers pulled up approximately to
her chest. Miss Huntsman was dead. She ched ed
the victim for vital signs and, upon finding none, she
phoned the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office ( T.
135-136). She further testified that at the point she
first observed the body rigor mortis had set in (T. 36).
3. The State then called N. D. Hayward, Chief

of Detectives of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office,
who testified that he arrived at the apartment in response to the call, examined the body of the victim,
and determined that her nightgown had been pulled
up about midway and that her panties were pulled
4

down over her buttocks in the back ( T. 235). He
testified as to the location of several of the items
in the room, including certain items on a bedstand
next to the bed which appeared to be in disarray, some
of them having apparently been knocked to the floor.
He further indicated that a grease or dirt smudge
was found on the bottom sheet of the bed and that
a newspaper, found in the corner of the room on
the floor amongst some pillows, hair curlers and a
hairnet, appeared to have blood spots on it (T. 2-kJ.).
He stated that deputies found two pieces of black
electrical cord, which they assumed to be the murder
weapon, on the floor next to the bed ( T. 244) . Most
of the items found in the room, includmg those referred
to above, were placed in evidence bags and removed
from the premises for further study.
4. Dr. James T. Weston, Chief Medical Examiner

for the State of Utah, testified that at approximately
11 :00 a.m., on March 23, 1971, he conducted a postmortem examination of the victim and determined that
the cause of death had been ligature strangulation.
He further testified that he found evidence that the
Yictim had been sexually assaulted, both in the vagina
and the rectum, and that he found quantities of sperm
in both body orifices. He indicated that evidence of
rape, as well as sodomy, was also found by the external
damage to the genitalia and the rectum of the victim,
including significant bruising (T. 258). He indicated
that there were small lesions on the breast which were
consistent with having been caused by suction similar to

s

a "monkey bite" ( T. 260). At this point in his testimony,
Dr. Weston was qualified by the State as a forensic
pathologist for the purpose of permitted testimony regarding conclusions he arrived at from his examination
of the body of the victim and other evidence ('f. 261262) . He indicated that he observed a bruise on the skull
of the victim consistent with a blow, and "denudations''
of the skin on her neck, indicating that she had used her
fingernails for the purpose of trying to loosen the ligature about her neck.
5. John Bernardo, a Salt Lake County Sheriff's
detective, testified that on the morning of l\larch 23,
1971, under the directions of N. D. Hayward, he went

to the home of Appellant, accompanied by Detectives
Forbes, Cannon, and Wall, to ask Sims some questions.
They were admitted to the front room of the home by
Appellant's mother, who informed them that Craig was
still asleep ( 'l'. 323) . Mrs. Sims a wakened Appellant,
and he came into the front room dressed only in a pair
of Levi's. The officers informed him that they were
there to ask him about a incident involving some of his
friends. After some further conversation, Sims was
advised that Miss Huntsman had been killed at Mrs.
Patterson's and that they were there to discuss the
matter with him. Officer Bernardo stated that he was
then read the "Miranda" warning off a card by Detective Forbes. Sims was then asked if he understood
his rights and replied, "Yes," and whether he would
mind talking to them. He said, "No, go right ahead."
Apparently the officers then asked him whether he knew
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Mrs. Patterson and if he had been there the night before, to which he must have answered, "Yes." After
about five minutes of conversation, Sims asked if he
could call his lawyer. The officers told him that he
could. Sims went into the bedroom of his home and
dialed counsel's number, only to find that he was unavailable (T. 336). Bernardo stated that Sims never
said specifically that he waived his rights, only that he
did not mind talking to them. Detective Bernardo
then substantially corrected his statement by indicating
that they had asked Sims whether he knew Mrs. Patterson and whether he had been over there the night before
prior to informing him of the fact of the murder or
advising him of his rights.
At any rate, Bernardo then said that they asked
Sims to go down to his shop with them, apparently for
the purpose of seeking matching electrical wire to
that found in the room where the victim was found.
Sims said that he wouldn't mind but that he would
have to dress. The officers followed him down the
hallway of his home into his bedroom and watched him
dress. Bernardo testified that, while in that room, he
saw a black turtleneck sweater on a chair on which he
observed some long hair, similar in color to that of the
victims (T. 350). Sims was dressed in Levi's, harness
boots, and a plaid shirt, and Bernardo asked him whether
or not those were the clothes he had been wearing the
night before. Sims replied in the affirmative. They then
went down to Sims' shop and conducted a rather
7

thorough search which failed to reveal any additional
evidence of any probative value (T. 304).
Bernardo testified that Sims was not under anes,
during the entire morning, but that he was arrested
on the ninth floor of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice
about l :00, after having been questioned by DetecliYe
Hayward (T. 351-352).
6. The State t hen called Robert E. Beams of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation laboratory in l\T ash-

ington, D. C., who testified that on or about l\Iarcl1
30, 1971, he received certain items, including pant.e.;
found on the victim, a bottom-tailored bed sheet, and
newspaper and clothing recovered from the
at
the time he was arrested. He testified that on the crotch
of the panties removed from the victim and on the sheet
from the bed in which she was found, he found small
spots of semen bearing "A" type International Blood
Grouping characteristics. He further testified that on the
right leg near the knee of the Levi's taken from Sims
he found a spot of semen also bearing "A" type properties. He further testified that there was blood found
on the left knee of the Levi's which could not be typed
and that there was a quantity of type "A" blood found
on the newspaper found in the corner of the murder
room (T. 435 to 450).
7. Lynn Davis, Salt Lake City Chemist, testified
that the defendant had type "A" blood (T. 399) and
that no minor blood grouping tests were performed.
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8. The State then called Robert E. Neil, also an

:F. B. I. laboratory agent, who testified that he received
a package from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's oif1ce
containing a blanket purportedly recovered from t.he
bed of the victim (State's Exhibit 23), a pair of Levi's
(State's Exhibit 24), a Levi jacket (State's Exhib.t
30), and a pair of jockey shorts (State's Exhibit 31)
recovered from the defendant at the time of his arrest.
He testified that, upon receiving these items, they were
placed upon a rack over a table bearing a clean sheet
of paper for each item and manually scraped to recover
any foreign textile fibers adhering to the garments.
He testified that he found one nylon fiber on the Levi
jacket recovered from the defendant which "could have
originated from Exhibit 23," the blanket from the bed
of the victim ( T. 456). He also testified that a nylon
fiber and several viscose fibers which could have come
from the same blanket were found both on the Levi's
(T. 458) and the jockey shorts (T. 458) taken from
the defendant.
He subsequently acknowledged that the blanket
was made of four kinds of fibers which were reasonably
equal in their tendency to shed onto other items placed
in contact with it ( T. 465), and that such fibers have
a considerable capacity to travel from one place to the
other (T. 466-7). He indicated that the fibers were
not used exclusively in blankets, but would normally
be found in such items as clothing and upholstery
fabric (T. 469). He stated that viscose fibers recovered
from a sample of upholstery fabric similar to that used
9

to upholster the couch in Sims' home were identical
to the viscose recovered from the blanket, (State's Exhibit 23) ( T. 1004). He did state that there were
differences in many of the other defense samples submitted to him, including a contradictory conclusion
that there was no nylon in the lining of Sims sonsjacket matching that found on his shorts and LeYi
jacket. (T. 1003).
9. Gerald Patterson, the seven year old son of
Charlene Patterson, testified that he knew Craig Sims
from his prior visits to the apartment and that on the
night of the murder he was awakened from his sleep
by a knock on the door. He answered and found Craig
Sims on the porch. Sims asked him to go into the T.Y.
room, get his wallet and bring it out to him. Gerald
testified that he did so, and that after delivering the
wallet to Sims he went back to bed. He testified that
Sims did not enter the apartment on that visit (T.
200-203).
10. Robert Yockey testified that he was an inmate

of the Salt Lake County jail during the period from
August to October of 1971, when Sims was incarcerated
there prior to trial. He stated that sometime during
October he had a conversation in which Sims told him
that he had gone to the apartment of Mrs. Patterson
for the purpose of retrieving his wallet which he had
purposely left there as a pretext for entry into the
apartment. He stated that Gerald Patterson opened
the door, and Sims said that upon entry he struck
10

the victim in the head in front of the boy and dragged
her into the bedrom, where he raped her. ( T. 532-536) .
On cross-examination, he made a great many other
statements embellishing the conversation which he
alleged to have taken place between he and the defendant at the jail, which are more particularly described and in Part XIII hereof.
Several other witnesses were called and testified
but their testimony did not in the overall contribute'
anything of significance to the evidence adduced against
the defendant.
The defense called witnesses who testified as follows:
A. Helen Steyl was called and testified that she
was an acquaintance of Sims, whom she had met at the
Sandpiper Lounge, where she worked in the evenings.
She testified that on the evening of March 22, 1972,
Sims came to the Sandpiper Lounge at 11 :30 p.m. and
remained there until 20 to 25 minutes after I :00 ( T.
645-649). If the writer may be pardoned for launching
into argument, it is significant that Mrs. Patterson
had testified that Sims did not leave the L.D.S. Hospital
until approximately 11 :00 p.m.
B. Ethel Sims, appellant's mother, testified that
Craig left home sometime around 9 :00 dra.ssed in
Levis and a red plaid shirt, and that she was awakened
by the sound of Craig's door slamming when he returned home at I :24 or I :26 a.m. She testified that

11

she was aware of the time that precisely because she
looked at the clock to see what time he had come in
( T. 664-666) . She said that she was not aware of his
leaving the house during the rest of the night.
C. Loren Sims, Appellant's father, testified that he
was up at 1 :00 on the morning of March 23rd with a
toothache and that approximately 1 :30 his son came
in. He testified that he had a conversation with him
after which Craig went to bed. He said that he did
not recall having heard his son for the rest of the night.
He testified that he had a hearing disability in one ear,
and indicated that that might have prevented him from
hearing any further sounds during the night (T. 692695) . He further testified that in his home he conducted an upholstery business and that he had a number
of samples and pieces of fabric containing gold and
yellow fibers of viscose and nylon amongst other
materials in his home (T. 696-701). He further testified that he had upholstered the couch in the living
room of their home during December of 1970, with
fabric which, according to the testimony of the F.B.I.
Agents, contained viscose fibers identical to those found
in the blanket recovered from the bed of the victim
(T. 704).
D. Lucille Ercanbrack, the next door neighbor of
Mrs. Patterson, testified that during the early morning hours of March 23rd, 1972, she was awakened by
noise outside her apartment. She first got out of bed
to see what the noise was and saw nothing, but sub12

sequently awoke and observed a person dressed in white
clothing outside of the Patterson apartment. She did
not know whether he was knocking on the door, or was
responsible for the noise ( T. 767 -769). She testified
that she had seen a person dressed the same whom she
assumed to be the same person in the parking lot of
the apartment apparently talking with Mrs. Patterson
and another party at approximately 5 p.m. the evening
before. ( T. 771) .
E. The defense then called Thomas Wieland, who
was qualified as an expert in the science of fabric fiber
analysis. He testified that fibers purportedly take11
from the lining of a jacket (which other testimony
indicated was worn by Sims' son when he visited Craig
the weekend before) were identical to fibers taken from
the blanket (State Exhibit 23) as to their nylon content. He further testified that vicose fibers taken from
Sims' couch were identical to the viscose fibers found
on Sims' clothing which were also identical to those
found on the blanket (T. 916).
F. Defense then called Elissa Snow, who testified
that she had dated Mr. Sims and that he took her home
from school at approximately 9:30 p.m. on March 22,
1971. She testified that on the previous Friday, he had
Yisited her at the place where she was babysitting and
that during that visit she had had sexual intercourse
with Mr. Sims while he was wearing Levis similar to
those worn by him on the evening of March 22nd, and
that during that intercourse, his levis weer not removed
13

( T. 976-77). She further coorobated the testimony of
Mrs. Patterson that Sims had a hubcap in his truck
for delivery to her, and that on the evening of March
22nd she suggested to Sims that he take it to Mrs.
Patterson (T. 997). Finally, she testified that on the
evening of March 22nd, she had caught her foot in
the door, stubbed her toe, and that she had placed it on
the front seat in his vehicle near Sims' levis while it
was bleeding. The obvious inference is that the blood
on his levis could have come from the toe (T. 989)
The bulk of the other defense testimony introduced
either corroborated these basic evidentiary statements,
or did not in themselves lend anything substantial to
the defense of the case.

I

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY ADMITTING TESTIMONY OF DEPUTIES AS TO WHAT THEY
SA"\V IN APPELLANT'S BEDROOM WHILE
CONDUCTING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
On the morning of March 23, 1971, Loren Craig
Sims was awakened by his mother at approximately
9 :00 a.m. Mrs. Sims informed him that there were
four policemen in the living room who wanted to talk
to him. He entered the front room partially dressed
and was confronted with questions by the Sheriff's
14

Deputies concerning his whereabouts on the previous
evening. At this point, he was informed that Linda
Huntsman had been murdered and was read the standard Miranda warning from a card by one of the police
officers. After this warning, and a fruitless effort to
contact his attorney, Sims was asked if he would
accompany the officers to his place of business. When
Sims informed the officers that he would have to dress
'
they asked him whether they could accompany him to
his bedroom. Sims' response, though not precisely clear
from the record, appears to be in the affirmative, as
much be reason of def a ult as anything, but he may
have nodded his head or made a comment such as "Yeah,
come ahead." The result was that a man just aroused
from sleep and accosted by the presence of four
sheriff's deputies was confronted by the fact that he
was obviously a suspect in a murder investigation; this
mau, without ever having been advised that he had any
rights whatever to prevent an unwanted invasion of
the private recesses of his home, was accompanied to
his bedroom by all four officers who there conducted
a thorough visual search. Sims then accompanied the
Police to his shop and was subsequently arrested at
approximately I :15 p.m. that afternoon.
At trial, over objection based on the defense
allegation that the search was warrantless and unconsented to ( T. 348) , one of the deputies (John Bernardo) testified that while in Sims' bedroom, he observed a black shirt with "numerous amount of hairs
on it ... brown ... light brown, hairs on it" on a chair
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by the foot of the bed, ( T. 340) Charlene Patterson
the woman in whose apartment Miss Huntsman
killed, testified that Sims had been wearing a black
turtleneck sweater the night before. Bernardo further
testified that the hairs were around ten to twelve inches
long, a length that roughly corresponded to the length
of the victim's hair. He further stated it was approximately the same color. Bernardo further said that he
took a close look around the apartment, including a
look into an open closet, while he was in the room.
His description of the total contents verifies the proposition of a close and searching observation, ( T. 359).
A. THE SEARCH OF THE SIMS BEDROOM "\VAS A
VIOLATION
OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT 'i\TAS
CONDUCTED WITHOUT A
WARRANT,
WAS OUTSIDE THE PURVIEW OF ANY
RECOGNIZED EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT, AND NO CONSENT
TO SEARCH WAS GIVEN.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States guarantees each citizen the right to
be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Because this right
has always been deemed by the Courts and people to
be paramount among Constitutional rights, when a
search is made without a warrant, it is presumed to
be unreasonable unless made incident to a valid arrest
16

or unless the fruits of the search are in plain view in
a place where the police were lawfully present. '¥hen
a search is made without a warrant, the prosecution
must establish that the search was reasonable in light
of the foregoing exceptions to the warrant requirement, or that the constitutional right was clearly
waived by the citizen entitled to its protections: Ren v.
U.S., 352 F.2d 617, 618 (10th Cir. 1965); failing this,
the prosecution may not utilize the fruits of the search
at trial.
It is evident that in the instant case the warrantless search of Sims' bedroom was not made incident
to his arrest because the events occurred over four hours
apart. And it is equally clear that the fruits of the
search of the bedroom were not in plain view of the
officers from the only place they were lawfully present,
i.e., the Sims livingroom. Therefore, whether or not
the search in question was valid depends upon whether
Sims waived his Fourth Amendment rights.

Appellant submits that it is evident that Sims d!d
not waive any rights. A waiver must be voluntary,
must be unequivocal, specific and intelligently given.
!\Terrell v. Superior Court of Orange County, 97 Cal.
Rep. 702 (Cal.App. 1971); Judd v. United States, 190
F.2d 649, 650-651 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
Sims' words and actions at the time the officers
demanded permission to follow him into his bedroom
did not constitute either a free, knowing and voluntary
17

consent or a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, but
were merely an unwilling submission to assertion of
authority and of no legal effect. People v. 11 remayne,
98 Cal.Rep. 193, 198 (Cal. App. 1971). 'Vhile an individual may waive the warrant requirement, the waiver
must be proved by clear and positive testimony indicating that the waiver or consent was given without
the presence of any duress or coercion, express or
implied. Such a consent cannot be general, but must
be unequivocal and specific, freely and intelligently
given; Judd v. United States, supra, at 650-651.
Waiver of constitutional immunity from unreasonable search and seizure cannot be conclusively presumed from a mere verbal expression of assent; Cipres
v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965). The
rule is particularly important and applicable when,
as here, the defendant was ignorant of his rights to
be free of the search (see discussion infra, p.p. 19-20)
and was undoubtedly intimidated by the presence of
four deputies at a time when he had been awake less
than five minutes. His actions were far short of an
intelligent and knowing waiver of a constitutional
right. In Bustimonte v. Schnecaote, 448 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1971) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
said: "Under many circumstances a reasonable person
might read an Officers 'May l' as the courteous expression of a demand backed by force of law."
The facts of the instant case clearly indicate that
Sims, understandably shocked from learning that he
was to be questioned in connection with a murder,
18

justifiably presumed the officers to be acting under
color of the badge and thus was intimidated to the
degree that, unaware that he had an alternative, h:;
acceded to the police demands by default. Every first
year law student knows that the law abhors a default
'
and in this context any remarks made by Sims, which
the State would have this Court construe as consent,
were nothing more than a pressured submission to overreaching authority. The prosecutoin fell far short of
meeting the requisite burden- to prove by clear and
positive evidence that an unequivocal and specific
consent to the search was given. Channel v. United
States, 285 F2d. 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1960).
ll. EVEN Il' THE CONDUCT OR REMARKS
OF SIMS COULD BE CONSTRUED TO BE A
CONSENT, THAT CONSENT WOULD NOT
MEET THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF
AV ALID WAIVER OF A CONSTITUTION AL
RIGHT.

While Constitutional rights may be waived, it is
clear that a waiver must be voluntary, unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given. N errell v. Superior
Court, Judd v. United States, both supra. And it is
axiomatic that an intelligent waiver of a right cannot
be made by a person who is unaware of the existence
of the right; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 166
Ed.2d. 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ( 1966). As was so classically
stated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct.,
19

"Waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." (Emphasis added). See also, Cipres v. United States, 343
F2d. 95 (9th Cir. 1965). It is obvious that one cannot
intelligently surrender that which he does not know
he has.
And it is obvious that courts cannot be assured
that a Defendant intended to make an intelligent waiver
of a known right, unless the police advise him of the
existence of the right. The imposition upon citizens
which the Constitution intended to prevent is well defined by the facts surrounding the search of Sims'
bedroom in the early morning hours. A conclusion that
Sims intended to waive his right to be free of an unreasonable search would have to be based on pure
speculation because the record is devoid of any indication that Sims knew he had a right to prevent the
officers from entering his bedroom without a warrant.
There is no merit to the argument that it would
be superfluous and repetitive to require the police,
having once given the Miranda warnings covering the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, to give similar
warnings as to the Fourth Amendment: This is so
because "only in this fashion can it be known beyond
doubt that the suspect ... has ... full knowledge of
what he is doing. An inference that a person has been
warned is not one and the same thing as an actual
warning," United States v. Moderacki, 280 F. Supp.
633, 636 (D. Del. 1968). In the instant case, the only
20

inference that Sims was warned is the fact that the
search was conducted. The warning requirement is not
for the protection of the hardened criminal, who in all
probability is well aware of his rights, and would not
benefit from a warning; rather, the requirement is intended for the protection of citizens who find themselves enmeshed in a web of unfortunate circumstances
such as those which engulfed Sims; for the person
faced with a sufficiently difficult choice even if he is
advised of his rights, but who becomes frightened and
confused and has to make the decision without the benefit of knowledge.
It seems incomprehensible that the Fourth Amendment, repeatedly ruled to provide a fundamental constitutional right, requires a less knowing waiver than
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

Perhaps the best statement of the defendant's position is found in United States v. Blalock, 255 F.Supp.
268, 269 (D.Penn. 1966): "The law requires that before a knowing and intelligent waiver of Fifth and
Sixth Amendment right can be made, the Defendant
must be advised of the nature of those rights. The same
kind of warning should be required in order to validatE
waiver of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Appellant does not contend that "the Miranda
prescription, formulated to give threshold warnings of
Fifth and Sixth Amendments rights ... must or ought
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to be mechanistically duplicated when circumstances
indicate the advisability of requesting a search;., Gorman v. U.S., 380 F.2d 154, 158 ( 1967). Appellant
does contend, however, that at the very least the police
must make a straight forward request to search. In
Gorman, supra, the Court said, that, "A straight forward request for permission to search" (emphasis add.
ed) was made and an unambiguous and positive response
was received. ' (ID. at 164). This was clearly not the
situation in the case at hand. These officers proceeded
into Sims' bedroom without advising him in any way.
shape or form that their purpose and intent was tu
conduct a search or that the law did not require him
to permit them into that room without his consent. Any
argument that an Officer, once having given the
Miranda warnings involving Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, should not be required to repeat a similar
warning with reference to the Fourth Amendment is
without merit, because, "only in that fashion can it be
known beyond doubt that the suspect . . . has . . . full
knowledge of what he is doing." Moderake, supra.
Perhaps the best summary of the defendant's
position is found in Blalock, supra, wherein the court
said: "to require law enforcement agents to advise the
subject of investigation of their rights would impose
no great burden nor would it unduly or unnecessarily
impede criminal investigation."
In the instant case, there was no warning given,
nor was there any evidence that Sims was aware of his
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right, secured by him by the Fourth Amendment to
be free from a warrantless search of his house unless
he was arrested, unless the fruits of this search were in
plain view, or unless some other well recognized exception to the warrant requirement was present. Lacking
such a warning, it can never be known with certainty
whdher Sims voluntarily waived those rights or
whether any purported waiver was uninformed and
unintentional by reason of his lack of knowledge. Therefore, under the cases cited above, all tes_timony concerning items observed in Sims' bedroom by Sheriff's detectives on the morning of March 23rd, which testimony
was unquestionably prejudicial, should have been suppressed. Failure to do so, despite proper defense objection, constitutes reversible error.

II

INTRODUCTION OF STATEMENTS
MADE BY DEFENDANT AT HIS HOME ON
THE MORNING OF MARCH 23, 1971, WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA.
At trial, Sheriff's Detective, John Bernardo, was
allowed to testify over defense objection concerning
statements made by Appellant when the Police first
invaded his home on the morning of March 23, 1971.
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Detective Bernardo testified that the Detectives entered
the Sims home, that l\frs. Sims said Craig was in bed
and that she would awaken him, and that when Appellant first came into the room, Detective Forbes told
him that soll!e of his friends had been involved in an
incident the night before and that lb-: Detectives would
like to talk to him about it. Bernardo then testified
that he handed Forbes a card from which Forbes read
the "l\1iranda warning" to Appellant. No objection
is raised to the form or substance of the warnings read
to Sims. The Detectives then asked Sims whether he
understood his rights, to which Sims replied "Yes."
They then asked "if he (Sims) would mind talking
to us?'', to which Sims replied, "No, go right ahead'
( T. 338) . Sims was then asked if he knew Charlene
Patterson, and if he was over to her house the night
before." "\<Vhen he replied in the affirmative, he was
asked, "What time he was over there." (T. 338). At
this point Sims said, "Why? What happened?" (T.
339). When Sims was informed that Linda Huntsman
had been murdered at Patterson's apartment, he stated
that he would like to call his Lawyer. After Sims had
tried to reach counsel by phone and failed, the Detectives accompanied him to his bedroom, where Bernardo
asked him whether or not the clothes he was then
wearing (which included Levis, shorts, and a plaid
flannel shirt) were the same ones that he was wearing
the evening before. Sims replied "Yes." (T. 351-367) ·
This last statement assumes particular relevance
because the question was ambiguous. There was no
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question whatever that he had been wearing Levis on
the evening before, but the shirt that he was then putting on did not match the description of the shirt which
had been given to the Sheriff's Detectives by witnesses
who said that on the previous evening Sims h:id worn
a black turtleneck sweater. If the levis he was wearing
were the same, but the shirt was different, his affirmative answer would be as right as it was wrong. The
testimony of Sheriff's Deputies regarding the "large
amounts" of hair seen on a turtleneck sweater in his
room could only have led the jury to believe that Sims
was lying about having worn the plaid shirt. In argument the District Attorney made much of this allegerl
effort by Sims to cover up the fact that he was wearing
the turtleneck shirt. The jury was urged to believe
that Sims, having been in the apartment of Charlene
Patterson the prior evening and knowing that the baby
sitter was there alone, her ample motive and opportunity
to return to the house and rape and kill the victim.
The first substantive question raised by this assignment of error is whether or not Sims was entitled to the
protection of the warnings required by Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct.
1602 ( 1966) , in the circumstances under which the
foregoing statements were made to the Deputies. The
Courts have generally held that the rule of Miranda
attaches at the time of "arrest". However, many cases
conclude that:
"An arrest to be effective, does not require

' of rrrrest or sLat on hJuse b OD l{ ng. ,,
forma1 words

Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct.
168 1959.

The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
has made the following statement of the law:
"Arrest is a legal term, and the time of arrest is
not necessarily that point in time when the police
officer formally proclaims that the accused is
being taken into custody." U.S. v. Washington,
249 .11'.Supp. 40 (D.C. Dist. 1965).
The law upon which Appellant relies is that when
a suspect is substantially interrupted, or his liberty of
movement is restricted by the arresting officers, then
the arrest is complete. H tnry v. U.S., supra. Sibruil
v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889
(1967), U.S. v.
328 F. Supp. 350 (E. D. La.
1971) and U.S. v. Stafford, 30 F. Supp. 785 (D.C.
Delaware 1969). It is clear that one need not be verbally
advised that he is under arrest to be entitled to the
protection of Mirwnda v. Arizona. Moran v. U.S.,
404 F .2d 663 (CA 10 1968), U. S. v. Frederick, 328
F.Supp. 264, (W.D. Okla. 1971).
The doctrine of custodial interrogation was origiated by the Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, 78
U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1578, ( 1964). That case held that
when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into any unsolved crime but has begun to focus on
a particular subject with questions tending to elicit incriminating statements, then the subject of the interrogation must be permitted to consult with his Lawyer.
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The concept of "custodial interrogation" was defined as
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
1lfiranda said that if such a significant deprivation of
freedom of action has occured regarding any Defendant, the doctrine espoused in that case is applicable and
the answers to questions put to Defendani: without benefit of the requisite warnings are inadmissable. Further
refinement of this doctrine is found in U.S. v. Phelps,
4,J.3 F.2d 246-247 ( CA5, 1971), wherein the court
stated:
"the mere fact that the interrogation take place
in the familiar surroundings of the Defendant's
home or place of business rather than in the police
station does not necessarily mean that the Defendant is not being subjected to a custodial interrogation, nor must a Defendant be under a
formal arrest prior to interrogation for the Miranda rights to apply."
The Indiana Supreme Court recently said:
"It appears the test isn't where the questioning
occurs but whether or not the individual has been
taken into custody or otherwise 'deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.' " Noel
v. State, 427 N.E. 2d 245-247.

In the instant case the record supports the conclusion that Sims was "significantly deprived of his freedom" of action at the time the referenced questions were
2-7

asked. Attention is called to the testimony of John Bernardo:

Q. You said that when you were in Sims house
you. went back to the bedroom. \Vhy is it that you
decided to go back there with him, Detective
Bernardo?
:MR. BANKS: I'll object to that-well go
ahead.
THE COURT: You may answer.
THE WITNESS: At the time, in my own
mind, I did not know whether Mr. Sims was
guilty or not of anything, but for his protection
and for my protection, I usually operate that way
- I want to be with him.
A. We always operate in numbers. We try to.

Q. Always operate in numbers? So you are saying that the reason four Policemen went down
there was to see that he didnt get away or something else that may be a danger to you?
A. That's the reason I went into the bedroom,
Sir. (T. 366)
And his further statement that prior to going into
Sims house, the Officers had searched his truck, obviously to see that there was no weapon in the vehicle. (T.
373).
The continued assertions of Detective Bernardo
that Sims was in no way a suspect at the time of this
visit to his home are not convincing in light of these
statements. If he was not a "suspect" he had every right
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to "escape." The fact that the Officers accompanied him
to his bedroom to see that he did not do so can permit no
conclusion but that their interest in questioning him was
sufficient to cause them to follow him into the private
recesses of his home, to make sure that he did not flee.
'l'o say that this does not constitute a "significant restriction of freedom of action" is to ignore the obvious.
The Officers further knew that they wanted Sims to
take them to his shop so they could conduct a search for
electrical wire of the type they believed to be the murder weapon. They, though permitting Sims to drive his
own truck, took precautions to search the vehicle prior
to permitting him to enter it alone. Again, this permits
no conclusion but that Sims was a suspect and that they
were sufficiently convinced of the necessity to keep him
in tow to go to some lengths to prevent his flight. With
four Officers standing in ones bedroom, it obvious that
Sims had good reason to believe that his freedom was
restricted by the interrogation being conducted in his
room. It is further obvious that the questions asked of
Sims were designed to elicit incriminating statements
from him. The questions about his actions on the prior
evening and the clothes he was wearing were questions
obviously designed to obtain evidence. Two of the questions relating to whether he knew Mrs. Patterson or had
been to her house the night before, were asked of Sims
prior to the time that he had been informed of the fact
of the murder or the fact that the Sheriff's Detectives
were there to interrogate him about it. In fact, they had
substantially tricked him by telling him that their in29

quiry was prompted by an incident involving some
friend of his. Such a shoddy cover for questions which
proved to be very prejudicial to him at trial can not be
excused.
His concern is demonstrated by his request to call
his attorney the moment the Detectives revealed the real
reason for their visit.
Appellant asserts that his efforts to reach his Attorney constitute an indication to these Officers that he
did not wish further interrogation without the presence
of Counsel. Wherefore, any further answers given by
him were involuntary and the result of intimidating
presence of four Officers in Sims' home concerning a
serious crime, and the confusion which they had set up in
his mind by their announcement that they were there to
investigate some incident involving his friends. At the
point where Sims indicated he wished to call his Att'.lrney, the Officers should have immediately ceased all
questions.
The assertion that Sims was entitled from the outset of his conversation with the Officers to protections
under Miranda v. Arizona, supra, made conclusive by
the testimony of John Bernardo that he first saw Sims
at nine or ten in the morning and that he arrested him at
I :00 or I :30 the same afternoon after having been with
him during the entire interim.
In response to the question whether he had more
evidence to indicate Sims' guilt at I :00 when he arrested
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him than he had at 9 :30 or 10 :00 in the morning when he
first talked to him, Bernardo said that he personally did
not have any additional information, was not aware that
anybody else in the Sheriff's department knew anything
more, and that he arrested Sims simply on the orders of
Deputy County Attorney Sawaya. Since "probable
cause" for the arrest was based on exactly the same evidence at hand when the Detectives were first in his
home, Appellant claims that the process of his arrest
commenced when they first talked to him. The fact that
it took approximately four hours to complete the process
of arrest is not sufficient to permit introduction of testimony taken in contravention of his rights under Miranda. Therefore, the admission into evidence of the
testimony of Sheriff's Detectives as to what Sims said in
his home is reversable error.

III
REVERSABLE ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN PERMITTING F.B.I. AGENTS TO TESTIFY CONCERNING FIBER SAMPLES, BLOOD SPOTS,
AND SEMEN SPOTS FOUND UPON THE
CLOTHING OF
APPELLANT
SEIZED
FROM HIM BY SHERIFFS' DEPUTIES AT
THE TIME OF HIS ARREST AND BOOKING
IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL.
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The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States provides:
'l'he right of the people to be free in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against umea.
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no 'V arrants shall issue, but upon probable .cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
'
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that warrantless searches are presumed to
be unreasonable unless they fall within the purview of
one of the well defined exceptions to the warrant requirement, i.e., searches incident to valid arrest, the
"plain view ' exception, "exigent circumstances" necessitating quick action for sufficient reason, and the "moving vehicle" exception. Appellant contends that the
search of his clothing conducted by the F.B.I. Laboratory in 'Vashington, D.C., during early April of 1971,
was unconstitutional because it was undertaken without
a Warrant, and does not fall within the ambit of any of
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At trial, Detective Benjamin Forbes, testified that
after Sims had been arrested, he and Detective John
Bernardo removed him to the Salt Lake County Jail
and booked him into the jail; required him to remove all
of his clothing in their presence and deliver his levis,
boots, jacket, shirt and shorts into their possession. These
items were placed by the Deputies into plastic bags.
Subsequently Detective Forbes packaged the clothing
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in a box with certain other evidence and shipped it to the
F.B.I. Laboratory in Washington, D. C., (T. 376-377)
where it arrived on March 31, 1971, or approximately
seven days after its seizure from Sims. ( T. 402). The
record indicates that gross and microscopic examinations were made of Sims clothing at the F.B.I. Laboratory. (T. 411).
At trial various F.B.I. Laboratory agents were allowed to testify over defense objection to the results of
these examinations. The Agents testified that they
found a small spot of semen on the leg of the levis containing Type "A" blood group factors ( T. 436) and
microscopic fibers on the levis jacket ( T. 456) , shorts
( T. 457) and le vis ( T. 458) which were microscopically
identical to certain particles retrieved from the blanket
which had been found on the bed on which the victim
was found.
These circumstances raise a somewhat unusual
question of the law of search and seizure because contrary to the usual sequence, the seizure of the clothing
in question preceded the search thereof. It should be
made plain that Appellant does not contend that the
Police did not have a right to remove from him the clothing that he was wearing when he was booked into jail,
nor does he contend that the Police did not have a right
to make a manual search of his clothes prior to booking
him into jail in order to determine whether they contained readily destructible evidence or a weapon which
could be used in an assault upon the Officers. Section
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77-54-20 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides for such

searches on a limited and restricted basis.

"When a person charged with a felony is supposed to .have
his person a dangerous weapon,
or anythmg which may be used as evidence of the
commission of the offense, the Officer making
the arrest shall cause him to be searched, and the
vveapcn er _,111er u,1ug
be retamed, subject
to the Order of the Court in which the Defendant
may be tried." (emphasis added) .
The seizure of Sims' clothing was apparently effected on the pretext of inventory as a matter of jail
procedure, rather than in reliance on the above statute
because there was no evidence which could have led the
Police to believe that Sims was "supposed to have on his
person any dangerous weapons or anything which might
be used as evidence of the commission of the offense."
Appellant makes no complaint of whatever "search"
was conducted as an incident of this seizure.
Appellant does contend, however, that the search
of his clothing approximately seven days later was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the friuts
of that search are inadmissible as evidence.
Again, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable
unless they fall within one of the well defined exceptions
to the warrant requirement. All of those exceptions are
based on factual circumstances which make securing a
Warrant prior to the search impracticle or impossible.

The first exception permits a limited search incident to
a valid arrest. This exception was clearly defined and
limited inChimelv. Caltfurnia, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L.Ed.2d
685, 89 S.Ct. 2034, and further discussed in the following additional cases: Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 {1964);
v. U.S.,
U.S. v. Rab(nztDitz, 339 U.S. 8 ( 1950);
331 U.S. 145 ( 1947); Angello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20
( 1925); Carol v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 ( 1925); and Wee/ls
v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 {1914). Chimel, supra, makes it
very plain that this exception to the warrant requirement is made necessary by the legitimate need to seize
weapons and other things which might be used to assault
an Officer or effect the escape of the person arrested,
and to prevent the destruction of readily destructable
evidence of the crime. These are the same policies which
underlie § 77-54-20 of the Utah Code. In Chimel, the
Supreme Court said:
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches
is justified by the need to seize weapons and
things which might be used to assault an Officer
or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crimethings which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence on the accused
o! under
his immediate control. But these JUshf1cations are
absent where a search is remote in time or place
from the arrest.
The facts of the instant case clearly take it far outside the limits of the quoted language. The Officers had
already satisfied themselves that Sims was not in possession of a weapon before they arrested him, and appar35

ently did not have probable cause to believe that there
was "evidence of the crime·' upon his clothing. At the
point where his clothes were seized, Sims was in jail and
no threat to anyone, and the clothes themselves were secure in the custody of the Sheriff's department. The
actual search of which Appellant complains occurred at
the F.B.I. Laboratory in Washington, D.C., more thau
two weeks later. Since after its seizure, there was no possible danger that evidence found on the clothing could
be concealed or destroyed by Sims, or that a weapon
could be retrieved from them to effect his escape, the
"incident to arrest exception" was clearly not available
to justify a warrantless search by the F.B.I.
The State may secondly contend that the search
falls within the "plain view" exception to the warrant
requirement which provides that an Officer may seize
evidence in plain view to him in a place where he is lawfully present. This exception to the Warrant requirement is clearly not applicable because, though the
clothes were in plain view, there is no evidence whatever
that the detectives saw any semen, fibers, blood, or anything else which they deemed significant on the articles
of clothing when they were taken from Sims. Even if
such were the case, a warrantless search could not be
justified because there was no danger that the evidence
could be altered or destroyed while the Officers obtained
a warrant.
A third exception to the warrant requirement has
generally been recognized in cases where the facts neces-
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sitate quick action for one good reason or another. Chapman v. U.S., 356 U.S. 610 (1961); Jones v. U.S., 493
(1958); Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10 (1948). However, in the instant case no such "exigent circumstance"
existed. Sims was in hand and had already been booked
into jail. It is obvious that he had no weapons. The
Sheriff's Deputies had no reason to believe that there
was readily destructable evidence on the clothes. They
had legal control of the clothing as a matter of jail procedure. There was no reason whatever to make obtaining a Search Warrant impossible or impracticle if they
had "probable cause" to believe that a search would turn
up evidence. It is therefore obvious that this exception to
the warrant requirement is inapplicable.
The plain fact is that the Police had Sims' clothing
lawfully in their possession and had all the time they
needed to obtain a 'V arrant. There was no possibility
that any evidence connected with the clothing would be
destroyed unless by the Police themselves. No facts
existed to even colorably bring the search of Sims'
clothes by the F.B.I. within any exception to the warrant requirement. Because the Police could easily have
complied with the warrant requirement, their failure to
do so makes the search unreasonable, and therefore a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
A further point should be raised in connection with
this issue and the provisions of Section 77-54-20, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, quoted above. It is to be noted
that the section specifies that the authority to search ex-
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tends only to cases in which a "person charged with a
felony is supposed to have on his person a dangerous
weapon or anything which may be used as evidence of
the commission of the offense." If we accept the precedures generally used in lhe arrest of those charged with
crimes as being ccnsistent with this statute, it has been
read to mean that Officers are permitted to search for
weapons anytime they make an arrest. This proposition
l:as been strengthened by the Utah "stop and frisk"
statute. Therefore, despite the fact that there was no information in the hands of the Police that would indicate
that Sims was "supposed" to have on his person a dangerous weapon, no contention is made that the initial
search of his clothing for weapons or readily destructable evidence was offensive no constitutional guarantees
or the Utah Rules.
However, this statute clearly specifies what must
be done with items seized in a search incident to an
arrest. It says that the weapon or "other things" must be
retained subject to the Order of the Court in which the
Defendant may be tried. In this case, the record reveals
no Order whatever from any Court relative to the items
of clothing seized from Sims at the jail. Therefore, even
though the seizure of the clothing itself was legal, once
it was seized and secured neither the Sheriff's Deputies
nor the F.B.I. had any right whatever to conduct further manual or microscopic searches of it without application to the court for its Warrant.
In sum, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held

38

that exploratory searches are unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. See e.g., U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932). In Lefkowitz, the search which was
condemned was an exploratory search of the Defendanf s home made under color of a lawful arrest. In holding the search illegal, the Court said that searches that
have as their object the acquisition of evidenciary material must, barring unusual circumstances, be made
nder the authority of a Warrant. The language of the
Court is significant:
"The informed and deliberate determinations
of the Magis r<-,te
d to ssue \Varrants
as toward sea 1ch'.'s and seizures permissa b e under the constitution are to be preferred over the
hurried actions of Officers and others who happen to make arrests. Security against the unlawful searches is more likely to be obtained by resort
to search Warrants than by relying upon the caution of Petty Officers who act in the excitement
that attends the arrest of persons accused of a
crime."
The exceptions enunciated permit Officers to make
cursory searches to protect themselves against injury
or death, to prevent escape by the person or party arrested, and to prevent the destruction of evidence. If an
Officer or Agent makes a search under other circumstances or for other reasons, those searches are required
to be made under the watchful eye of Judicial authority.
The long and short of this is that if there was probable cause at the time these clothes were taken into the
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possession of the Deputies to believe that lhe cllltbes
contained evidence of the commission of the offense
'
then the Officers were under a duty and obligation to
apply to a Magistrate for a Search 'i\T arrant to permit a
further detailed search thereof. If there was not probable cause at the time of the arrest to believe that such
evidence was present upon the clothes, then the search
by the F.B.I. is clearly exploratory and therefore illegal.
Neither of these conditions were met in the instant case
with the results that the search of Sims' clothing conducted by the F.B.I. in Washington, D.C. was unreasonable within the meaning of the }--.ourth Amendment,
and any testimony of F.B.I. Agents as to items found
upon or seized from said clothing should have been suppressed. The Trial Courts' failure to suppress such testimony was prejudicial and reversable error.

IV

THE CARELESS HANDLING OF SIMS'
CLOTHING BY SHERIFF'S DEPUTIES
RENDERED
ANY
EVIDENCE
FOUND '
THEREON INADMISSIBLE.
Rule 45 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence as
adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah effective July I,
1971, provides as follows:
"Except as is in these rules otherwise pro:vided,
the Judge may at his discretion exclude evidence

if he finds that it's probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that it's admission
. ·.. (b) create. su.bstantial danger of undue
pre1ud1ce or of confusmg the issue or of misleading the jury ... "

Appellant contends that the introduction of evidence of microscopic fibers found on Sims' clothing by
the F.B.l. which clearly constitutes the most significant
circumstantial evidence which could be viewed as connecting him with the commission of this crime, was so
prejudicial and misleading that its admission was an
abuse of discretion constituting reversible error under
the above rule. A review of the entire record of this case
indicates that there was no other evidence adduced at
trial which had anywhere near the prejudicial effect as
this testimony in which F.B.l. Agents stated that fibers
found on Sims' clothing were microscopically identical
to those of which the blanket from the bed of the murder
victim was made. (States Exhibit "23") The manner in
which all the foregoing evidence was handled creates an
immense risk that the probative value of this testimony
was reduced to nil because of the likelihood that the fibers found on Sims' clothing at the F.B.I. Laboratory
in 'Vashington, D.C., got onto his clothing either in the
jail or in transit to the F.B.I. Laboratory.
Sheriff's Deputy, Benjamin Forbes testified that
after Sims was booked into jail he and John Bernardo
were present when Sims removed all of his clothing and
gave it to Forbes, who placed the various items of clothing in separate plastic bags, sealed them, and subse-
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quently sent them to the }-..B.I. Laboratory in Washington, D.C. The items of clothing to which reference is
made, were a pair of boots, a levi jacket, levis, and
jockey shorts. Robert E. Neill, F.B.l. Laboratory
Technician testified that he received a number of Exhibits including the subject clothing on the 31st of
March, 1971. (T. 402-404). He stated that he did not
have an independent recollection of the nature of the
packaging of these items, ( T. 405) but he did say that
the items were received in a cardboard box which also
contained States Exhibit "23, ' the blanket taken off the
bed in which Linda Huntsman was found ( T. 405) . The
significance of all of this is brought into focus by the
following testimony of Robert Neill:

MR. BARBER

Q. I see. And if we were to shake this blanket
over here in front of both of us with a relatively
dark suit on and shake it here, is it likely that
some (fibers) might well get on your suit and my
suit?
MR. NEILL
A. I am sure I have some on my suit right now.
Q. So they do have a capacity to travel?

A. Yes.
Q. And I suppose that numerous factors tell
you more about the capacity, air currents?
A. What's the question, Counselor?

Q. Well, there are other factors, I mean, they
-12

have a capacity, but their distance of travel
aepends ...
A.
on ambiant conditions such as you
suggest, air, also static charges, brittleness,
how they are handled . . . all sorts of factors
are involved. ( T. p466) (emphasis added)
Fuither evidene;e of the transferability of these fibers is found on T. 470 where Mr. Neill said:
Q. With reference to your examination for fibers
you did, . were the only foreign fibers that you
recovered from these items (
clothing) the
fibers that you have identified as having possibly
come from this blanket or having been miscoscopic to it?
A. No Sir.
Q. And would you say that most of them were
simiiar to these, most of the ones you recovered?
A. No Sir. I would say that most of the foreign
fibers recovered from the garment in question
t.he iev1 trousers and the levi Jacket and the under
shorts were microscopically dissimilar from the
fibers that compose Exhibit 23, the blanket.
On at least three separate occasions the clothes and
blankcL comd have and likely did come into close proximity of each other creating a substantial opportunity
for the transfer of microscopic fibers from the blanket
found on the bed of the victim to the clothing of Mr.
Sims. The State argued at trial that the fact that fibers
which c· uld have come from the blanket on the bed of
the victim were found on Sims' clothing was evidence
that he <l b en near the bed and killed the victim.

The likelihood that transfer of these fibers occurred
after the clothing was removed from Sims is so great that
the probative value of this evidence is far outweighed
by its capacity to unfairly prejudice the Defendant.
'Vhat is worse, is that this fiber evidence is virtually the
only evidence which could legitimately place the Defendant at the scene of the crime.
The first opportunity for transfer was raised by the
testimony of Benjamin Forbes, where he stated that on
the morning that Sims was arrested he was present in the
room wherein the victim and the blanket, (States Exhibit 23) were found.

Q. Been near the bed when that blanket was
on it?
A. Within two feet. (emphasis added)
Q. Within two feet? And at any time were
within two feet of the blanket, was it moved
any way?

i:1

A. Not to my knowledge. ( T. 386)
In light of the testimony of Robert E. Neill, the
possibility that there was a transfer of fiber filaments in
the room where the victim was found to the clothing of
Detective Forbes who subsequently handled all the
clothing seized from Sims is very great.
Furthermore, we have Forbes' testimony about how
Sims' clothing was handled when it was taken from him.
He testified that Sims' clothing was placed in a cardboard box together with the blanket. Judicial notice
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should be taken of the proposition that in transit a large
cardboard box will suffer considerable shaking and
banging which would create a high likelihood that
brittle, microscopic fibers from the blanket would find
find their way into the body of the box. Although Forbes
testified that the bags in which the clothing was placed
were sealed, he admitted that the seals were of the pressure kind which have a considerable capacity to break
open. Once this is done, the seal is no longer airtight and
would not prevent fibers found in the box from finding
their way into the bags containing the clothing, with the
result that upon manually scraping the clothes at the
F.Il.I. Laboratories, such fibers would be recovered.
Finally, we have the testimony of Detective Forbes
that when the items of clothing were taken from Sims,
they were placed on a bench in the shower room of the
jail prior to being placed in individual plastic bags. (T.
387) . He then described the procedure as follows:
Q. And then what did he take off?

A. I would say his shirt next, but I can't be

absolutely positive.
Q. All right. And what did he do with that shirt?
A. I think he laid it on the bench there in the
shower room.

Q. He did, himself?

A. Yes.
Q. And then what did he take off?
A. Probably his shorts or levis.
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Q. Levi's, huh? And what did he do

those:

A. Well, they probably went on the bench too.

Q. And then he took off his shorts?
A. Yes.
Q. And laid them on the bench?

A. Yes.
He laid
clothes on top of each other,
did he not-kmd of in a pile?
A. I couldn't say that for sure.

* * *

Q. O.K. Do you distinctly recall that one item
of clothing did not touch another at that time?
A. Two that I could say positively and that
would be the boots and the jacket.

Q. They did not touch any of the others, but
the others were intermingled with each other,
that is, the shorts and the levis?
A. That's possible. (T. 388-389).
This testimony raises a question about the relative
probative value of the fibers found on the jockey shorts
as compared to the ones found on Sims' outer garments.
The jury likely gave much greater weight to the viscose
and nylon found on the jockey shorts by reason of the
fact that those are undergarments. This is particularly
significant when it is recalled that Sims testified that he
had been in the apartment where the murder occurred on
the night of the crime. He sat on the furniture and
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touched items in the house to which, given testimony of
Special Agent Neill regarding the transferability of
these fibers, such fibers could have been adhering. Furthermore, we have the testimony of Mrs. Patterson that
Sims had taken her to work on that evening and while
dressing in her uniform she had sat on the bed on which
the subject blanket was found, and that at the time she
had done so the bed was unmade. She subsequently testified that she sat next to Sims in his truck, that she kissed
him, and that at the time she did so she was also wearing
a coat which had been present in the house many times.
(T. 96). The possibility that the fibers on Sims' outer
clothing came from the furniture in Mrs. Patterson's
home, or from her person when they touched, is immense.
Assuming this to be true, the likelihood that when
Forbes took Sims' clothing from him and placed it on
the bench, viscose and nylon fibers secondarily transferred from his outer clothing to his jockey shorts creates
a nagging probability that the jury was given the erroneous impression that Sims had fibers on his shorts which
could only have gotten there if he were in the murder
room with his outer garments removed, as would likely
be the case had he raped the victim.
The sloppy and careless handling of this key evidence so tainted it that in order to give it any consideration at all, the jury would have to engage in rank speculation at least two or three times. To permit testimony
requiring such treatment into evidence robs Defendant
of a fair trial, and is therefore, reversable error.
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v
DEFENDANT \VAS CONVICTED IN VIOLATION OF THE 14thA.MENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
BECAUSE SECTION 76-30-3, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS A.MENDED IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Section 76-30-1, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953), as
amended reads as follows:
"MURDER" Defined. _Murder is the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
Section 76-30-2 provides:
"MALICE" Defined. Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is ·
manifest a deliberate intention unlawfully to
take the life of a fellow creature. It is implied
when no considerable provocation appears, or
when the circumstances attending the killing
show an abandoned and malignant heart.
Those two Sections carefully state the elements
necessary in order for a killing to constitute the crime of
murder. The general definition of "murder" makes no
distinction of degrees, but clearly indicates that without
malice aforethought, a homocide is something other than
"murder.' Section 76-30-3, Utah Code Annotated states
as follows:

DEGREES OF .MURDER.

Every murder
oy
iymg ,11 wait, or by any
other kmd of wilful, deliberate, malicious, and
premeditated killing; or comm.twd m the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson,
rape, burglary, or robbery, or perpetrated from
a premeditated design m11awftuly and mahciouslyto e:ffect the death ofany human being other
tnan the one who is killed; or perpetrated by any
act greatly dangerous to the lives of others and
evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of human life ;-is murder in the first degree. Any
other homicide committed under such circumstances as would have constituted murder at
common law is murder in the second degree.
When read together, what these statutes require if
one is to be convicted of first degree murder under the
"felony murder rule" is that the jury must find ( 1) that
there was a killing, ( 2) that the killing was accomplished with malice aforethought so as to bring the killing it::,eli: within the definition of murder in 76-30-2, and
(3) tha, he murder was committed in the perpetration
to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery or
of, er ,;,
burglary. The most significant and ignored facet of this
!
is the use of the word "murder"
defoL
rather , lia · 'killing" or "homocide" in the first sentence
of section 76-30-3.
This Court has apparently made short shift of the
difficulty of this language in the case of State v.
43 U.135, 134 P. 132, by stating the followmg:

Under this section if the murder was committed

in any of the felonies therein enumerated it
is first ?egree murder, even though the killing
was accidental, because premeditation and deliberation are not essential in such case.
This quotation reveals a superb linquistic facility in
the use of the words ·'. Murder," "accidental killing," and
"premeditation aud deliberation." By stating that an
"accidental killing" can be first degree murder, the court
has effectively repealed Section 76-30-1 and re-enacted
Section 76-30-3 by substituting the word "killing" for
the word "murder" in the first sentence of that section.
".Murder" and "ki1ling·' are not synonymous in this statutory scheme. There is good reason for the choice of
words in this section which cannot be ignored. The same
judicial error is found in instruction No. 18 given to the
jury in the trial of this case.
You are instructed that before you can find
the Defendant, Loren Craig Sims, guilty of the
first degree as charged in the information, you
must believe from the evidence and beyond reasonable doubt of each of the following elements:
I. That on or about the 23rd day of March, 1971,
the Defendant, Loren Craig Sims, killed Linda
Huntsman in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
although he may have had no intention of taking
her Zif e. (emphasis added)

2. That the said Linda Huntsman died within
one year and a day after the cause of death was
administered.
3. That the killing was unlawful.
added)

so

(emphasis

the killing was committed in the perpetration by the Defendant of a rape ....

4.

It is manifest that neither the language of Mewhinney, nor that of tnis mstruction comply with the requirements of Sections 76-30-1 through 76-30-3 of the Utah
Code Annotated as amended. The first sentence of 7630-3, supra, cleariy reqmres a findmg that the killmg is
a "murder' before the degree of that murder can be
ascertained by the jury. Under the above instructions, no
question was ever submitted to the jury as to whether or
not the killing of Linda Huntsman was a murder, within the definition of that crime stated in 76-30-1 requiring that before a killing is a murder, it must be found to
have been committed with "malice aforethought," either
express or implied.
It is not asserted by Appellant that the jury could
not, if it believed all the evidence produced against the
Defendant, have found malice as that term is defined in
Section 76-30-2. However, without such a separate finding by the jury, Appellants' conviction is unlawful under the section charged.
This proposition is supported by the language of
section 76-1-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended which states:
UNION OF ACT AND INTENT NECESSARY. In every crime or public offense there
must exist a union or joint operation of act and
intent or criminal negligence.
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This statutory requirement stemming from the
early common law, is not suspended in the case of murder. The "malice' required to make a homocide punish- '
able as murder may be found if an "intent to take a life"
is found by the jury as a fact, either because it finds that
no considerable provocation appeared, or that the circumstances attending the killing showed an abandoned
and malignant heart.
The application of the three statutory prov1s10ns
cited to the instant case is caught in the crossfire of two
legal propositions.
First, if as here, section 76-30-3 is read as it was in
Mewhinney, not to require the question of whether a
homocide committed in the perpetration of a robbery,
rape, arson or burglary constitutes "murder," the section
is at odds with the statutory provision requiring a finding of "intent" before an act is a crime, and violates the
due process. clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and the same clause of Article I Section 12
of the Utah Constitution.
Mr. Justice Jackson writing for the Supreme
Court, set forth an exhaustive analysis of the requirement that an "act" be found to be coupled with an "intent" or mens rea before it can be a crime. In Moressette
v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed.
288 ( 1952) , he traced the history of the concept and
noted that in certain contexts, namely administrative
criminal regulations involving small penalties, the court
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had permitted a waiver of the "intent" requirement on
grounds of public policy. However, the court made clear
that where crimes derived from the common law are involved, the requirement of an independent finding of
intent is undisturbed.
Stealing, larcency, and its vanants and equivalents, were among the earliest offenses known to
the law that existed before legislation; they are
invas1011s of r.gl;ts ,.f pro.1_-erty wmch stir a sense
of insecurity in the whole community and arouse
puhlic demand for retribution, the penalty is
high, and when a sufficient amount is involved,
the infamy is that of a felony, which, says Maitland, is " . . . as bad a word as you can give to
man or thing." State courts of last resort, on
whom fall the heaviest burden of interpreting
criminal law in this country, have consistently
retained the requirement of intent in larceny
type offenses. If any State has deviated, the
exception has neither been called to our attention
nor disclosed in our research.
Every reason for requiring the finding of "intent"
in larceny cases is more applicable in the case of murder
in the first degree. The invasion is of the person; the
public demand for "retribution" more clamorous; the
penalty is the forfeiture of life; and the approbrium connected to the charge unparallelled. Therefore, permitting conviction of that crime without a finding of intent
is an unacceptable legal anomaly, totally at odds with
the Anglo-American scheme of jurisprudence.
The only remotely rational justification for the
felony murder rule as it is applied in Utah is the argu-
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meut that the legislature has, and has exercised, authority to declare that intent to kill, i.e., ''malice aforethought" must be inferred from the very fact that an individual commits arson, rape, robbery, or burglary. Such
legislative aggrandizement is impermissible for two reasons. }.;"irst is the body of law reserving the finding of
intent to the finder of fact. This approach is the only
logical approach because what is in a man's mind depends on the man and the individual circumstances of
each case. Second, is the argument that the legislature
is permitted to enact an irrebuttable presumption that
the very commission of arson, rape, robbery, or burglary
requires aii "intention" to kill or "an abandoned or malignant heart." This position is simply unsupportable.
It is clear that none of the offenses enumerated in
the felony murder rule necessarily manifest an intent to
kill. Nor can it be stated as a proposition free from "reasonable doubt" that the commission of all these offens es '
demonstrates a tot3 l lack of restraint from taking a human life or even a wanton disregard for human life;
characteristics included within the definitions of "abandoned" and "malignant." If this is what the legislature
has said by its enactment, it has '2olated the requirement

of due process.
Mr. Justice Harlan writing for the court in Muggler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 31 L.Ed. 205, 8 S.Ct. 273
(1887) stated the law as follows:
It belongs to the legislative branch of
ment to exert what are known as the police
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powers of the state, and to determine primarily
what measures are appropriate or needful for
the protection of the public morals, the public
health, the public safety.
It
not follow that every statute enacted
ostensibly for the promotion of those ends is to
be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police
power of the State. There are, of necess1tv 1imits
beyond which legislation cannot rightftilly go.
courts must . . . upon their own responsibility determine whether . . . these limits have
been passed. If, therefore, a statute purporting
to have been enacted to protect the public health,
... morals, or ... safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a probable
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge,
and thereby give effect to the constitution.

That section 76-30-3 of the Utah Code falls within the
above rule as one where the means taken to protect the
public bear no reasonable relationship to those ends, is
plain when one analyzes the crime of burglary, one enumerated in the subject section. It is a crime against property, not generally involving a deadly weapon nor any
force against the person, and generally committed at
night so as to avoid human contacts. There is nothing
about it suggesting intent to kill or an "abandoned or
malignant" attitude toward human life. As with rape,
there is no evidence that a killing occurs in even a minute
fraction of the total burglaries committed. Even the relationship between arson and robbery, and murder is
most questionable. To permit the legislature to create
an irrebutable presumption based on such an unsupport-
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ed assumption and apply it to a question which has always been required to be found as a fact beyond areasonable doubt by the jury is intolerable.
The only way this statute can be applied constitutionally is the way it was written; that is for the malice
or intent question to be submitted to the jury with proper instructions. If this is not done, Due Process at it was
here, is violated, and the conviction cannot stand.

Yl
THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
TO GRANT DEFENDANT MOTION FOR
CHANGE OF VENUE WAS REVERSABLE
ERROR.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public
?Y
an impartial jury by the State and D1str1ct
Courts wherein the crime shall have been committed.
Similarly, Article I Section 12 of the Constitution
of the State of Utah provides:
In all criminal prosecutions the .accused
have the right to have a speedy trial by an 1m·
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partial jury in the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been commttte<l.
It has long been recognized that the foregoing language creates a conflict in that often, for one reason or
another, it has been found impossible to provide a
"speedy and impartial trial' in the .. county or district'' where the .. offense is alleged to have been committed.''

In recognition of this conflict, the Legislature of
the State of Utah has provided for removal of certain
trials from the county in which the offense was committed to another district of the State Court. Section 7726-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
The criminal action may be removed from the
Court in which it is pending upon the application of the Defendant, upon the ground that a
fair and impartial trial cannot be had in a county
where the action is pending.
Further argument for the removal process is found
in the "Due Process clause" of the 14th Amendment
under which the Supreme Court has ruled that when for
one reason or another, the State fails to provide a Defendant with a fair and impartial trial, a vi?lation of his
rights under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment occurs. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145.
Despite the foregoing, the Supreme Court of Utah
has repeatedly refused to reverse the refusal of State
trial courts to grant Motions for a Change of Venue
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grounded on defense assertions that community prejudice and pre-trial publicity would deny defendant a trial
meeting the requirements of the due process clause.
State v. Moore, Ill Utah 458, 183 P.2d 893; State v.
Canmow, 64 Utah 87, 228 P. 563; State v. Smith, 22
U2d. 287, 358 P.2d 342. P.36.
In the Cannow case, supra, this Court upheld the
trial courts denial of Defendant's Motion because though
it acknowledged that the numerous newspaper clippings
which had been circulated in the county where the case
had been tried and the newspaper articles were potentially prejudicial. The same newspaper circulated in
practically all other counties in the State with the result
that the effect of that publicity would be the same regardless of the county in which the case might be tried.
Appellant respectfully submits that this case, which
is typical of most cases out of the Utah Supreme Court
in this field, is distinguishable by reason of the following
language in the opinion of the court:
The record . . . shows that the Appellant did
not exhaust its full number of peremptory challenges, and hence, counsel at the time the jury
was empanelled, must have been satisfied that
the jurors had been qualified as fair and impartial men ... true, it is that counsel, in support
of the Motion for a Change of Venue, filed . · ·
Affidavits to which were attached a considerable number of newspapers clippings.-In the
clippings as is usually the case, the crime and
the perp:trator thereof were denounced in strong
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language. The record also shows the same newspape!. circulated in practically all other commumbes of the state, and hence if the newspaper had any effect, the effect would in all
probability have been the same in whatever county the case might have been set for trial. (Can-

1ton, suµrn, a .

.1.'·

.JvV).

In the instant case, Defendant, besides exercising
every permissible preemptory challange, made lengthy
and reasoned argument that because of the pretrial publicity which had been circulated throughout Salt Lake
County, an impartial jury could not be found. Furthermore, the record in this case is devoid of any evidence
whatever, that the publicity in the Salt Lake papers is
freely circulated in other counties as it is in the Salt
Lake Valley. We have such a representation from the
District Attorney, but no evidence was produced to support this claim. In fact, according to the figures provided by the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret News
which are attached as Exhibit I to the appendix of this
Brief, this representation is simply not true. In so far as
it concerns the Deseret News, Appellant contends that
the prime reason that the Deseret News is circulated in
the Southern and Northern counties of this State is that
it contains the L.D.S. Church News. It is likely that the
persons who read it do so primarily for that section and
not for the items which are relevant only to Salt Lake
County. Furthermore, the Tribune and the Deseret
the broadest scope of National and InterNews
national news of any papers in the state. For this reason
even though a great many people outside Salt Lake
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County peruse the National and International and
Church Sections of these papers, the likelihood that they
pay the same attention to items of local Salt Lake interest is so remote as to provide insufficient grounds to hold
that such publicity as was found in this case would have
the same prejudicial effect outside Salt Lake County as
it would have in the Third Judicial District.
One additional reason generally relied upon by this
court for ref using to reverse trial court denials of Motions for Change of Venue, is that the discretion to grant
or deny such
is vested in the Trial Courts,
and that is subject to reversal only upon a plain
showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Carrington, 15
U.480, 50P. 526; State v. Christenson, 73 U. 757, 276
P. 163; State v. Green, 86 U. 192, 40 P. 2d 961; State v.
BeBee, no U. 484, 175 P.2d 478, together with the
cases cited in BeBee, to-wit State v. Cannow, supra;
State v. Kuhis, 63 U. 362, 227 P. 476.
This line of authority which seems to be the absolute rule in the State of Utah is clearly contrary to the
position of most State Courts in the United States and,
to some extent the position of the Supreme Court of the
United States. The better rule is stated by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Irving v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717; Shepard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 344; and Marshall v.

U.S., 360 U.S. 310.
In Irving v. Dowd, supra, the Supreme Court held
that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the De-

60

fendant a Change of Venue in the face of widespread
and inflamatory publicity in the news media concerning
murders allegedly perpetrated by the Defendant. The
court ruled that where such widespread and prejudicial
publicity occurs, the Defendant is entitled to a Change
of Venue as a matter of right. The Supreme Court said:
Here the buildup of prejudice is clear and convincing. An examination of the current community pattern of thought as indicated by the
popular news media is singularly relieving . . .
It cannot be gainsayed that the force of this continued adverse publicity causes substantial excitement and fosters wrong prejudice among the
people . . . (338 U.S. 725-726.)
The following cases are typical of State Court decisions containing rulings that Change of Venue would
be granted where there is a substantial probability of
popular prejudice due to news coverage. State v. BeBee,
supra; Forsythe v. State, 410 Ohio 2d 104, 230 N.E. 2d
611; Juelich v. U.S., 214 F.2d 950 (CA7, 1954); State
v. Canada, 48 Iowa 440, 164 N.W. 794; State v.
Thompson, 226 Minn. 385, 123 N.W. 378; State v. Bruman, 127 Mont. 579, 269 P.2d 796; People v. Leadeche,
258 N.W. 115; People v. Fernadez, 89 N.W.2d 421;
Rogers v. State, 236 S.W.2d 141.
In Forsythe, supra, the Supreme Court of Ohio,
used the following language which should control the
case at hand:
The defense Motion for Change of Venue
should have been granted . . . with his life at
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stake, it is not requiring too much that
have been tried in an atmosphere undi.sturbed by so intense publication ... of details
of the
agamst him. Where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to
w.111 prevent fair trial, and postponing the
trial will not remove the threat, the Judge should
remove the case to. another county not so permeated with publicity. (emphasis added).
Closer to home, the Utah Supreme Court some of
its earlier cases indicated that a claim of adverse and
prejudicial pretrial publicity should be sufficient
grounds to require Change of Venue. In holding failure
to do so an abuse of discretion, the Court through Justice Wade, in State v. BeBee, supra, stated:
However, it certainly would not have been
unfair forthe court to have granted a Change
of Venue, and we are in opinion that it would
have been better if the trial court had granted
the change under the circumstances of this case
for there were inflammatory newspaper comments ... ( 175 P2d. 481)
The temper of Justice Wades' language, raises
what may be the most pursuasive argument in favor of
the practice of granting defense Motions for Changes of
Venue. That is simply the proposition that in a criminal
case, particularly when the Defendant stands a chance
of forfeiting his life to the State, he ought to be entitled
to the fairest possible trial which can be reasonably
given to him, on the theory that to provide him with
thing less is to deny him the due process of law to which
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he is entitled. During the trial of Loren Craig Sims, the
District Attorney was heard to say: "The law requires
that we give .Mr. Sims a fair trial not a perfect one."
Such is indeed the case, but where there is any reasonable chance of decreasing prejudice by removing the
case to a county in which less publicity outcry may have
been heard about the crime and the perpetrator thereof,
failure to do so is a violation of the "Due Process clause"
of the 14th Amendment.
Part II of the appendix of this Brief is a chronological copy of Articles found in the daily papers of Salt
Lake County about this crime and this Defendant. It
cannot be denied that this mass of local and national coverage has a great potential to create prejudice in the
minds of jurors and place before them evidence which
they might not otherwise be entitled to see. Ref using to
mitigate this potential by changing the location of the
trial simply demonstrates that we are satisfied to do less
than provide the Defendant with the fairest trial reasonably within our power.
Of particular significance is the fact that nearly all
of the articles relating to Loren Craig Sims published in
the local press immediately before his second trial, made
reference both to the fact that he had been previously
of which he was
convicted by a jury of the very
then being tried and his conviction the week before his
retrial for murder of the crime of violent rape. If we permit the press to place before the jury evidence of prior
and unrelated crimes we reduce the rule of evidence
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which prohibits the introduction of such evidence at
trial to a sham.
In this case Sims did not place his character in is·
sue, and in reliance on the Rules of Evidence as enacted
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, Appellant
claims that he is entitled to be tried by a jury which is not
aware of his conviction of unrelated crmies or the same
crime. To tolerate any likelihood that there were people
on the jury who may have seen publicity tying him to
these other matters is to deny him the protection of the
law.
By reason of all the foregoing, Appellant asserts
that the failure and refusal of the trial courts to grant
him a Change of Venue pursuant to his written Motion
is an abuse of discretion constituting reversable error.

THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT
TO PERMIT JAMES T. WESTON, A QUALIFIED FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST, TO TESTIFY AS TO THE PROBABLE SEQUENCE OF
EVENTS COMMENCING WITH THE FIRST
PHYSICAL INJURY TO THE VICTIM AND
TERMINATING WITH HER DEATH WAS
REVERSABLE ERROR.
The following series of questions and answers ap-
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pears during the testimony of James T. 'IV eston, Chief
Medical Examiner for the State of Utah:
MR.BARBER

Q. Alright, Doctor, considering your examination of the body of Miss Huntsman, is it-would
it be
for you as a forensic scientist to
come to any conclusion about the sequence of
events beginning with her first physical injury
until her death from the location of her injuries
and their nature upon an examination?
DR. WESTON
A. Well, I am afraid that there would he some
degree speculation based on confession on other
cases which have a pattern of injuries, if this is
acceptable. (emphasis added)

Q. Well, do those-have you had experience
which would lead you to conclude something of
the accuracy of those speculations?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And based on all of that, can you give us your
best estimate of what happened to Miss Huntsman, commencing with your physical examination?

MR. BANKS: May I take the witness on
voir dire? To be absolutely speculative in this
matter, it would be, would it not, without outside examination?
A. Yes, Sir.
MR. BANKS: I object to it.
MR. BARBER: May I ask one question be65

yond that question? 'Vhat do you mean by
absolutely speculative?

A. Well, it would simply be a comparison of
the physical findings of this case with the ph.1Jsical findings of comparable injuries and comparable mechanics of death when the actual sequence of events were established. (emphasis
added).
Q. And in your experience with those two or
eight or ten or twelve other cases, is there a high
degree of consistency as to the reconstruction
which is based on those injuries, or that's all. Is
there a consistency to those?
A. Yes, there is a fair amount of consistency.
Q. And with similar injuries and similar locations, have you had occasion to determine that
those, that the reconstruction based on those confessions would not be accurate.
A. No, Sir.
MR. BARBER: We'll submit it, and we
request as ask forMR. BANKS: It's usurping the function of
the jury and I would object.
MR. BARBER: He is an expert and he's
qualified.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained,
the Court determines that it would be too speculative. ( T. 828-829)
Appellant contends that the Court committed reversable error in sustaining the States objection to the
proposed testimony of Dr. Weston.
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First, attention must be drawn to the qualifications
of Dr. Weston, both as a .Medical Expert and as a Forensic
His summary of the meaning of the
term Forensic Pathologist is the source of the initial
basis for Appellants contention that he was fully qualified to testify as to a likely reconstruction of the events
leading to Miss Huntsman's death. ('I'. 261-262}. The
following statements as to the duties and qualifications
of a J;"'orensic Pathologist helped to bring his role into
focus:
He, (The Forensic Pathologist) works with
an Investigator or in this case, a member of the
Sheriff's otfice. The Investigator furnishes him
information which to the Forensic Pathologist is
every bit as valuable as a hospital chart. If an
Anatomic Pathologist looks on a patient who
has died in a hospital and putting that information together with his information and all the
supporting lab documents that tell you what
the lab-with chemical analysis of different portions of the body show, you reach a conclusion
then concerning the cause-the anatomic cause
m the matter that was caused, by somebody some other person or persons; whether it was
ace.dentally caused by this person or
it was an intentional act on the part of this person. This is what a Forensic Pathologist does.
- Jl-20:2"

'l 11e following additional definition is found in
Blaa s Law Dictionary, 4th ed. 1951. p. 777.

FORENSIC MEDICINE OR MEDICAL
Ul\,ISPRUDENCE, as it is called, is "that
"ience which teaches the application of every
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of,,
to the purpose
of the law hence its hm1ts are on the one hand
the requirements of the law, and on the other
the whole range of medicine . . . and in som:
cases, all these branches of science are required
to enab.le a court of law to arrive at a proper
conclusion on a contested question affecting
liability.
The long and short of this is that the additional
training of a Forensic Pathologist over that required of
a Physical Pathologist is that training designed to qualify him to extrapolate legal conclusions from pathological evidence. Reconstruction of evt:nts from the nature
'
locus, and timing of physical injuries certainly does not
fall outside the perview of this expertise.
Appellant acknowledges that as a general rule, the
discretion of a Trial Judge in excluding expert testimony will not be reversed absent of showing a clear error
or abuse of discretion.
S. Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 139 U.S. 551, 35 L.Ed. 270, II S.Ct. 653; Stillworth c% B. Manufacturing v. PhiUps, 130 U.S. 520, 32
L.Ed. 1039, 9 S.Ct. 601; Shateagay Ore and Iron Co. v.
Blick, 144 U.S. 146, 36 L.Ed. 510, 12 S.Ct. 731. How·
ever, several facts militate against the argument that
this general rule should be applied to the instant case.
Dr. Weston testified that he had an immense
amount of medical and physical data available to him
from his observations of the victim. His description of
the physical injuries of the victim stretches from page
266 of the transcript through page 297. The Doctor test-
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ified that he had not only observed the body but had removed tissue and examined it microscopically. He said
that from those examinations he could form reasonable
conclusions about the period of time that those injuries
had been upon the body. He was permitted to testify to
certain of the probable acts of the assailant including
the fact that since he found spermatozoa both in the
rectum and vagina of the victim, the assailant had ejaculated twice into the body cavities of the victim. (T. 813)
He also was permitted to testify as to certain evidence
which probably would have been found upon the body
of the assailant by reason of his conduct. He testified
that the marks on the outside of the body were consistent
with strangulation by a ligature similar to certain electrical wire which was placed in evidence ( T. 268) . He
was permitted to testify about the kind of act which
would likely cause the bruises found on the breast of the
dctim. (T. 269). He was in possession of facts which
were sufficient in every respect to form a basis for his
expert opinions about the course of events which lead to
the death of the victim. Attention is called to his statement of what such opinions or conclusions would be
based upon:
Comparison of
physical
in this case
with physical findmgs of maybe eight or ten .or
twelve cases in which there were comparable mi uries and comparable mechanics of death wherein the actual sequence of death was established.
He further stated that as to those cases where the
similar injuries had been found and the sequence of
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events known there was a "fair degree" of consistency
in the relationship of the cause to the effect. He testified
that he was aware of no case where he had reason to disbelieve the sequence of events that had been related to
him. This, together with the total mass of information
:rrnilable to him both in terms of time, the fact that some
wounds obviously occured after others, and the confessions of which he was aware to explain the manner in
which similar wounds had been caused to other persons,
there can be no question that Weston was fully capable
of rendering an opinion as to the course of events lead·
ing to the death of the victim.
Rule 56 of the Rules of Evidence as adopted by
the Supreme Court of Utah, effective July 1, 1971,
states as follows:

TESTIMONY IN FORM OF OPINION:
( 2) If the witness is testifying as an expert,
testimony of the witness in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to such opinions as the
Judge finds are (a) based on facts or
re·
ceived by, known or made known to the witness
at the hearing and (b) within the scope
special knowledge, skill,
or
possessed by the witness . . .
m
form of opinions or inferences otherwise adm1s·
sable under these rules is not objectionable be·
cause it embraces the ultimate issue or issues to
be decided by the trier of fact.
Paragraph 4 of this rule obviously disposes of Mr.
Banks' objection that the testimony would userp the
function of the jury. (T. 829). The matters about which
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Dr. Weston was asked to testify were "based on facts or
data perceived by . . . the witness and within scope of
special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed
by the witness."
The importance of this assignment of error is found
in the _statements of witnesses who testified about the
whereabouts of the Defendant on the evening of March
22, and the morning of March 23, 1971, during the
period of time when the victim was murdered. Miss
Huntsman was last seen alive at shortly before 10 :00
P.M. (T. 51). Helen Steyl, the waitress at a tavern on
Highland Drive at approximately 40th South testified
that Sims entered that establishment at 11 :30 P.M.,
some 30 minutes after he had left the hospital. (T. 647),
and that he was there until approximately I :20 or I :25
A.M. (T. 649). The Defendant's Mother testified that
he returned home at either 24 or 26 minutes after I :00,
approximately five to ten minutes after he had left the
Sandpiper Lounge, and that he did not leave the house
again until he left in the company of Sheriff's Deputies
the next morning. (T. 666-669). We do not know
whether the jury believed all of this alibi but we have
no reason to believe that they did not. Assuming that
they did, the only relevant period of time when Sims was
not in the company of other people was from 11 :00 to
11 :30 P.M. on the evening of March 22, 1971. The State
argued that this is the period of time during which Sims
drove from the L.D.S. Hospital to approximately 37th
South and Highland Drive, entered the apartment, hit
Miss Huntsman in the head, raped her, depositing sperm
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in her vagina, sodomized her, ejaculating again in her
rectum, recovered from the effects of the crime and
likely put .Miss Huntsman back into bed, and then drove
to the Sandpiper Lounge, arriving at 11 :30.
All this testimony raised what may well have been
the most important questions in determining the guilt or
innocence of the l)efendant; "How long did it take the
guilty person to commit this crime," and "could Loren
Craig Sims have done it in the time during which witnesses could not account for his whereabouts." It is clear
that the second question cannot be answered without the
first. Dr. Weston could have answered the first question
but was not permitted to do so even though he testified
that some of the wounds were on the body up to 20 minutes before death, that sufficient time was required to
permit a man to ejaculate twice, and that there was a
period of time required during which the ligature must
have been applied about the neck of the victim. Given all
this, it cannot be said that he did not have sufficient data
available to form and express an admissable conclusion
as to the period of time required to do all these things.
Not only did he have the physical evidence, but he had
evidence accumulated through years of experience as a
medical examiner and coroner in that in at least eight,
ten or twelve cases he had seen similar injuries and had
data to back up the sequence of events which led to their
presence on the body. From this experience, he could
have testified with a high degree of accuracy as to the
time required to commit this crime. To refuse to permit
him to do so is to deny this Defendant the right to make

72

the jurors aware of the length of time so that if in fact
they did believe his alibi evidence, they likely would have
been required to conclude that the time during which
Sims was not accounted for would be insufficient to
commit this crime.
Th2 State
answer that most of this evidence
got into the record one way or the other anyway, however, having it come into the records over a period off 50
or 7 5 pages of testimony by a highly technical witness is
not nearly as enlightening to the jury, nor, incidentally
as helpful to the Defendant as to require the court to
permit essentially the same testimony in the form of a
summary reconstruction of events. The Defendant contends that the failure of the court to permit Dr. Weston
to so testify constitutes reversable error.

YEI
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON REASONABLE DOUBT ARE INCOMPREHENSIBLE CONTRADICTORY AND THERE'
FORE VIOLATE THE XIV AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES.
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:

INSTRUCTION #14
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree
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of
that satisfies and convinces your mind
to a pomt that you conscientiously have a continuing belief in the guilt of Defend ant such as
'lfOU would be willing t<;t act upon in the most
important matters relating to your own affairs.
A reasonable doubt is a real and substantial
It is not one that is merely possible
or imagmary because almost everything relating
to human affairs is open to some possible doubt.

INSTRUCTION #15
If the evidence in this case can be interpreted
or explained on any reasonable ground other than
the guilt cf the Defendant, vou must find him
not guilty.
·
These instructions, particularly when given together, are confusing, contrary to law, contradictory,
and so prejudicial to the Defendant that they denied
him due process of the law.
Instruction No. 14 incorporates what is known as
the "personal business" definition of reasonable doubt,
which has been approved in varying contexts by many
courts. See e.g., Bishop v. United States, 107 F.2d 297.
This has apparently been done because of the great difficulty in defining reasonable doubt in positive terms
and the fact that analogy is useful in helping the jury
understand the term.
However, the courts have generally limited their
approval of this analogy to language instructing
jury that "reasonable doubt" is the kind of doubt which
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would lead a person to refrain from acting or hesitate to
act in the most important matters relating to his own
affairs. This is entirely different from using the personal business test as an affirmative definition of reasonable doubt, as was done by the Trial Court in this
case.
Thus, Bishop v. United States, 107 F.2d 297, 303
( C.A. D.C.), approved the use of the personal business
test, stating that a reasonable doubt is "such a doubt
that would cause a reasonable man to hesitate to act ...
in matters of importance to themselves."
The United States Supreme Court in Hopt v.
Utah, 120 U.S. 430, approved a different instruction on
reasonable doubt involving the personal business analogy. The Court did not approve of the test in all cases,
but simply stated that coupled with all the other instructions which were given in that case, the use of the
bus'.ness analogy wa_s not improper. A thorough analysis of the H opt case by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Padock v. United States, 79 F.2d 872 (C.A. 9)
contains this language:
"We do not believe that that Court (Supreme
Court) will a pp rove the business test which
are insegregated from other elements
cluded in the instruction approved m Hopt v.
Utah, supra."
The lack of consistency and clarity in the decisions
about the use of this analogy creates an intolerable difficulty in the administration of criminal justice. The
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drafting of a definition of "reasonable doubt" has
baffled students of jurisprudence for years, but inasmuch as that standard of proof is one of the major foundations of our system, fairness, clarity, and uniformity
are absolutely necessary to constitutional administratio;1
of the criminal law. The instructions on reasonable
doubt given in this case do not pass constitutional
muster.
Perhaps the best statement of the law is found in
Curry v. United States, 347 F.2d 468, where the Court
examined this reasonable doubt instruction:
In order to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence must be such that you
would be willing to act upon it in the more important affairs of your own life ... If you haye
an abiding conviction of the Defendants' guilt
such as you would be willing to act upon in the
more weighty and important matters in your
own affairs, then you have no reasonable doubt
"
In dealing with this charge, which is remarkably
similar to the one given in the instant case, the court
said:
"These portions of the charge on reasonable
doubt are not in accord with the law. Being convinced beyond a reasonable doubt cann.ot be
equated with being "willing t? act upon m the
weighty and important affairs of your . own
life." A prudent person called upon to act man
important business or family matter
certainly carefully weigh and balance considera-
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tions and risks pending in both directions. But
in making and acting on a judgment in so doing:
such a person would not necessarily be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had made
the right judgment. Human experience. unfortunately, is to the contrary.
The position taken by the Court in the Padock case
is clearly demonstrated by applying it to a factual situaticm. An example of a "weighty matter of ones own
affairs" is the purchase of a residential dwelling by the
average family. A man does not purchase one home over
another because he is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that one is better. He evaluates the good and the
bad factors about each of the houses and comes to a conclusion about what is best for him in the circumstances.
To say this decision making process comports with the
long standing requirement that criminal convictions be
based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt is to ignore
the obvious import of that term. Business decisions are
not made on evidence sufficient to create a "moral certainty." Therefore, unless the business test is used to
define the nature of that doubt which, if present in the
mind of a Juror, shall require him to vote for acquittal,
the use of the test is unconstitutional as a violation of the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment.
An additional difficulty is raised by the interplay
of Instruction No. 14 and 15. The first sentence of Instruction No. 14 says, "proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is that degree of proof that satisfies and convinces your
mind .. .",whereas the first sentence of Instruction 15 is

77

objectiYe. Read together, these two instructions create
the following difficulty. If a Juror were intellectually .
convinced that all the evidence could be explained
equally consisent with either the gu.lt or innocence of
the Defendant, but he personally believed the explanation consistent with guilt, it would be impossible for him
tc vote cons:stent with both instructions. Instruction No.
15, clearly directs him to find the Defendant not guilty
because he can see a reasonable hypothesis under which
a!l the evidence could be explained consistent with the
Defendant's innocence. On the other hand, he would
hnve an abiding and continuing belief in the guilt of the
Defendant based on his personal belief in the other alternative, which would require his vote of guilty under
Instruction No. 14. In criminal proceedings proof must
be "beyond a reasonable doubt," that being a different
standard than "a preponderance of the evidence." Great '
sch::ilars of jurisprudence have traditionally failed in the
mind boggling task of defining the difference between
these burdens of proof. It is practically a "cruel and
unusual punishment" to demand this feat of a layman
with guidelines as confusing and contradictory as those '
given in this case. For this reason, in addition to those
stated previously, the instructions given by the Trial
Court in this case deprived the Defendant of a fair trial
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
XIV Amendment to the Constitution.
IX
UNDER

THE

CIRCUMSTANCES
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OF

THIS CASE, THE JURY WAS INCAPABLE
OF RENDERING A JUST DECISION COMPORTING 'iVITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
DUE PROCESS.
A. The verdict of guilt in this case was the product
of fatigue and compromise, not deliberation, due to the
lateness of the hour at which the verdict was reached.
The trial of this case conunenced on November 1, 1971,
and continued through ten
days until the early
morning hours of November 13, 1971. On November 12,
the Court convened at 10 :00 a.m. for the purpose of
hearing closing arguments of counsel. Those arguments
extended well past 5 :00 p.m. comprising one full day
during which the jury was required to attentively listen
to the attorneys. The jury was charged, and sometime
between 5 :00 and 6 o'clock p.m., the trial was concluded
and the jury was taken to dinner before deliberations
began. Deliberations began about 7 o'clock p.m., and
continued until after 3 o'clock in the morning. At the
time that the verdict was rendered, therefore, the jury
had been in session for approximately 17 hours, with
only brief pauses for meals.
During the course of the trial, approximately 95
exhibits were introduced and entered into evidence, all
of which were present in the jury room. The trial included testimony covering over 1,200 pages of transcript. At the end of a hard day in court, the jury was
asked to go into the jury room and rationally determine
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whether to forfeit a human life. Deliberations did not
conclude until after 3 o'clock in the morning. To ask a
jury to make rational decisions under those conditions
about conflicting evidence and testimony in the quantity
presented in this trial is to ask the impossible.
Though the court decisions on this subject are
sparse, Appellant recommends to the Court adoption of
the position of the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit in United States v. Parks, 411 F.2d 1171:
We are not prepared to say that no jury
under any circumstances can ever be kept at
its deliberations until, 3 o'clock in the morning.
Much must be left to the discretion of the trial
court. But we do frown upon the practice of
keeping the jury at work until the small hours
of the morning, particularly when it reports that
it is tired. It seems to us that any verdict returned
at 3 :07 in the morning after many hours of deliberation following a long trial is much more
likely to be the product of mental and physical
fatigue than of true deliberation. The better
practice in our opinion would be at midnight
or so, unless there were indications of a speedy
verdict, or the jury expressed a wish to continue
its deliberations, either to declare a mistrial or
to direct the Marshall to provide the jury with
overnight accommodations and breakfast before
it returned to its deliberations. (CA2, 1969).
In our enlightened age, it can be no less than rea·
sonable, particularly when a man's life hangs in the
ance, to provide the jury with circumstances in which it
can deliberate as freely as possible from physical and
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mental pressures which are likely to inhibit reason and
iogic. Failure to do so is barbaric, and deprives a Defendant charged with a capital offense of a trial which
is fair as we can reasonably provide. Such a failure is a
violation of his right to due process under the evolving
standards of good sense and fairness which are increasingly being read into the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment and which should attach to Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
B. The mass of testimony, the number of exhibits,
and the difficulty of the Court's instructions to the jury
made reasoned deliberation impossible during the early
morning hours following a full day of trial. There would
be little question about the long deliberations of this
jlll'y were it a simple case involving two or three witnesses offering conflicting testimony, where the verdict
depended purely upon the assessment of the credibility
of the witnesses. This case however, is a far cry from
such a lawsuit. Thirty-eight wienesses were called to the
stand. Many offered conflicting testimony. In at least
six cases, the substance of the witnesses' testimony was
extremely technical, scientific data requiring a great
deal of concentration. There were many photographs,
some of which could be construed in different ways.
This entire mish-mash of information was dumped into
the laps of Jurors who had sat in a court room for two
full weeks, at 7 o'clock p.m. when each of those jurors
knew that in all likelihood he would be there for the balance of the night if not longer. Assuming that the jurors
could legitimately come to a determination of facts as
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they believed them, they were then required to come to a
verdict applying to those facts the instructions of the
Court, which under Part VIII hereof have been demonstrated to be immensely difficult to analyze. It is likely
that this analysis occurred after midnight, at a time
when the jury had been at attention for a period in
excess of 14 hours. It does not comport with the requirements of due process to subbmit a man to the possible
forfeiture of his life on the decision of people in this
physical and mental state and faced with a task as mammoth as that faced by these jurors.
Unless the exortation of Parks is followed in a situation like this, we deprive the Defendant not only of the
best trial available, but even of a trial which is reasonable under the loosest definition of that term. His conviction should therefore be reversed.

x
IN LIGHT OF FURIMAN VS. GEORGIA,
THE REQUIREMENT OF A UNITARY VERDICT AS TO GUILT AND PUNISHMENT
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE DENIED THE DEFENDANT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
On May 31, 1971, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided M cGOJUtha v. California, and its com-
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panion case Crampton v. Ohio,
U.S. 183, 28 L.Ed.
711, 91 S.Ct. 1454, where by what amounts to a 6 to
3 majority the Court approved the use by the States of
either unitary or bifurcated trials in capital cases. Mr .
.I ustice Black, who concurred with the majority of five,
agreed with most of the Court's reasoning, but felt compelled to write a further comment that the imposition of
death penalty itself did not violate the VIII Amendment.
The State of Utah has always used the unitary system in capital cases; that is, the jury in a capital case is
required to render its verdict as to the guilt or innocense
of the Defendant as well as its recommendation for leniency if any at the same time. Essentially, the jury which
determines guilt must at the same time determine
whether a man shall live or suffer death.
The challenge to the untitary verdict system argued in M cGautha, supra, was based on the allegation
that a Defendant's right against self-incrimination is
imposed upon by the rule of evidence permitting crossexamination about a prior unrelated offense in the event
that he takes the stand in his own defense, even when his
testimony is relevant only to the issue of punishment,
and not to guilt, and the further argument that the Ohio
statute was unconstitutionally vague because it did not
establish any standards by which the jury should determine whether or not to recommend mercy. The Court in
a carefully reasoned decision rejected both arguments
and upheld the unitary system.
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However, an exhaustive dissent was written by :\Ir.
Justice Douglas who disagreed with both of the major
holdings ..Mr. Justice Brennen further dissented in a
separate opinion in which he found the entire unitary
jury verdict system lacking in due process.
Subsequently, on June 29, 1972, the Supreme
Court in a 5 to 4 decision struck down the death penalty
in the case of Furman v. Georgia, U.S. 33 L.Ed2d, 346,
92 S.Ct. ( 1971). Though the holding in Furman is restricted to the cases decided, the holding has apparently
been applied to all cases, numbering some 602, in which
suspension of the death penalty could do the Defendant
any good. The effect of Furman has apparently been,
although the opinion itself does not require it, that the
holding is retroactive to all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed but not carried out. Appellant
contends that Furman requires a reanalysis of the holding in the M cGautha case. This reevaluation is not required by any of the arguments put forward by the Appellants in M cGautha, but by additional considerations
which raise their heads in this case.
As has been stated above, the jury in this case was
in deliberation, after a two week trial, from 7 o'clock in
the evening until sometime after 3 o'clock in the morning.
The proposition of a unitary verdict raises what this
writer views to be the grim possibility of an unconstitutional informity arising out of the circumstances under
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which the unitary verdict in this case was reached. Hypothetically, several of the jurors are fully convinced of
Defendants guilt and equally convinced that the nature
of the crime demands the death penalty. An equal number of jurors are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
of Defendants guilt, though there is evidence indicating
that he may be guilty. The latter jurors state that they
are certainly not sure enough of guilt to send the Defendant to his death. In a frustrated compromise in the
early hours of the morning, those with what may be "reasonable doubts" of guilt agree to vote "guilty" on the
condition that those convinced that they should exact the
death penalty agree to recommend leniency. It is impossible to know that such an illicit agreement was not
reached. It is clear that the jury verdict procedure practice in Utah is an open invitation for such illegality. For
good reason, it has always been the policy of the Courts
to jealously guard the sanctity of the jury room and prohibit incursions by Lawyers or Court personnel into the
nature of the deliberations of any jury. This position
whether merited or not, has not prevented Courts from
analysing the possible effect of certain testimony and
other facts upon jurors, and when the probabilities of resulting unfairness have been deemed great enough to
pose a threat to the validity of the verdict, Courts have
enunciated rules to reduce the likelihood of such impositions on the fair administration of justice.
An example of the judicial process can bbe found
in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 84
S.Ct. 177 4, 1 A.L.R. 3rd 1205, wherein the Supreme
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Court of the United States required separate trials of
the issue of guilt and voluntariness of a confession in a
case where the Defendant though admitting that he had
confessed to the crime alleged that he had done so under
coercion because the Court found it impossible to ascertain that the jury was not "influenced" by its knowledge
of the very existence of foe confession. A similar situation is found in Bruton v. United States, 391, U.S. 123,
135, 20 L. Ed.2d 476, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, ( 1969) where
the issue was whether instructions that the jury was to
disregard testimony heard by them, but subsequently
excluded were sufficient to insure that Defendant would
not be prejudiced by that testimony.
The court said:
There are contexts in which the risk that the
jury will not orcannot, follow instructions is so
great, and the consequences of failure so vital
to the Defendant, that the practical and human
limitations of the jury cannot be ignored.
This language is particularly applicable to the instant case. The jury had the horrendously burdensome
task of ferreting out evidence and testimony heard over
a period of two weeks; and the hour as which they
reached their verdict was after 3 o'clock in the morning
after some 10 hours of deliberation. No one can accurately assess the frustration felt by a group of jurors
under these conditions nor can one safely assume that a
compromise such as the one outlined in the hypothetical
exchange set forth above did not occur. It is clear that
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if such a colloquay did occur, and the jury reached its
verdict by such a process, that verdict violates due process because it was arrived at due to something besides
the evidence presented and reasonable inferences therefrom. To accept even a reasonable possibility that such
was the case is to deny the Defendant due process of the
law.
This argument is made even stronger by the fact
that were Sims trial held today, no such danger could
exist because it has been eliminated by the decision of
the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, supra. It is
true that even if they had not spared his life, he would
not be executed because his sentence would likely be
reduced to life imprisonment under the Furman case. In
light of the likelihood of a compromise verdict in the circumstances of this case, affirming the verdict of this
jury would permit the State to extract its verdict of
guilt as the result of a compromise involving the surrender of the insistence of one or more juror on a punishment which the State could not now impose. It is certain that if the death penalty itself could not have been
imposed a guilty verdict based on the ominous threat of
that now impermissible penalty is equally tainted.
Therefore, Appellants conviction must be reversed for
a new trial without that threat.

XI
REFERENCE BY A WITNESS TO THE
FACT THAT SIMS HAD BEEN GRANTED A
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NE'iV TRIAL WAS PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Robert Yockey, witness for the prosecution, in testifying about
alleged cunYersation between he and the
Defendant at the Salt Lake County Jail prior to Sims'
trial said:
"When I went passed his cell, I asked him
what the deal was on his case, what was going to
happen? And he said he didn't know. He didn't
know for sure and that he'd been granted a new
trial and then we got into a discussion about the
case." (T. 506)
Defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground of
this reference to a prior trial. A lengthy discussion and
argument was held in chambers. (T. 506-531). The
Court apparently found, despite the fact that it acknowledged a possibility of prejudice ( T. 531), that
such prejudice as might have arisen could be cured by
admonishing the jury to disregard the testimony.
It is axiomatic that evidence of prior convictions is
inadmissible at trial, unless within one of the well recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule. This rule has
recently been adopted in the Rules of Evidence as
adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah, Rule 47, which
states:

(a) Evidence of specific
of condl.1ct,
other than evidence of convict10n of a crime
which tends to prove the trait to be bad, shall be
inadmissible, and
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( b) In a criminal action, evidence of a trait of
an.
character as tending to prove his
gmlt or mnocence of the offense charged ( i)
may not be excluded by the judge under Rule
45 if offered by the accused to prove his innocence, and (ii) if offered by the prosecution to
prove h:s guilt, may be admitted only after the
accused has introduced evidence of his good
character.
The language of this rule seems to be based on the
reasoning of Mickelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,
93 L.Ed. 168, 69 S.Ct. 213 wherein the Supreme Court,
after long and careful analysis, refused to disapprove of
the practice of cross-examining a Defendant who had
taken the stand in his own defense about prior and unrelated criminal convictions, stating that limiting instructions in that context would be sufficient to eradicate
any prejudice. This, and other instances where the introduction of evidence of prior crimes is permitted is
found in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 17 L.Ed. 2d
606, 87 S.Ct. 648, limiting such exceptional circumstances to those in which the prior convictions are used
to show intent, malice, lack of credibility, or motive.
Spencer, supra, allowed Texas to permit the introduction of evidence of prior convictions where Texas law
permitted the Jury to impose a stronger sentence upon
multiple offenders. Outside the purview of these exceptions, such evidence has been universally deemed so prejudicial as to be inadmissable for the purpose of showing
a propensity to commit the crime for which the Defendant is being tried.
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In the instant case, the problem is even more difficult. Here, rather than showing that the Defendant had
been convicted of another unrelated crime, the comment
of the witness Yockey put before the jury evidence from
which the only logical inference was that the Defendant
had been convicted, likely by a jury, of the very crime
for which
was then on trial. Judge Hall made this
comment in response to a statement by Defense Counsel:
MR. DAY: Yockey said he got a new trialimplies that he was convicted.
THE COURT: I think that's the meat of it.
What the implication is whether it's good, bad
or in his favor, it is possible.

It is clear even to a lay jury that a new trial is never
granted unless there has been a prior trial and conviction.
A jury's knowledge that the Defendant had previously
been convicted of this same crime raises two problems.
First, this was a capital case on which no jury can legitimately be pleased to sit. It must be an immensely difficult task for any lay person to cast a vote which could
mean the termination of a man's life. Therefore, it is not
illogical to assume that a jury knowing that another
jury had already convicted the Defendant and that he
had escaped the punishment imposed by that jury, probably on a legal technicality, could ease the burden of
decision on the second jury. Such an easing is illigitimate
because under our system, each jury should feel the
gravity and consequence of its own decision; those con-
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sequences beiug an integral part of the process of deliberation itself. Secondly, the jury may well have been
convinced that there was evidence presented on a prior
trial which they had not heard because it had been ruled
inadmissable. As a point of fact, this was true. Knowledge of the prior trial and conviction could therefore
permit a juror, wto was on the borderline between reasonable doubt and a vote of guilt, to believe there was
likely other evidence which he had not seen which must
have been incriminating. As a result, he might feel
entitled to weigh the likelihood of guilt heavier. Again,
we raise a question about the processes of jury deliberation. The cases cited in part X hereof, indicate that it
is not impermissable for Appellante courts to reach
conclusions about these processes. Therefore, the question raised is clearly within the courts cognizance.
The writer does not wish to seem hypercritical of
the jury system. It is certainly the bulwark of the administration of criminal justice. However, that does not
excuse us from keeping the information to which a jury
has access strictly within the bounds of the Rules of Evidence. If the comment of the witness Yockey about a
prior trial is permitted to stand in this case, we shall
simply have said that the age old rule of evidence prohib.ting the introduction of prior convictions is unimportant, and not worthy of enforcement in this jurisdiction.
There is a further consideration raised by the position of the Supreme Court in writing the Mickelson and
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Spencer cases, 8ttpra. The following language in Sprncer, summarizes the Courts restraint in interfering with
state trial practices:
"It has never been thought that such cases
(due process cases) establish this court as a rule
making organ for the promulgation of State
Rules of Cnminal Procedure." (at page 614)
It is this position of the Supreme Court that makes the
role of the State Courts of last resort so important. The
Federal System has been established to permit a wide
variation of state trial practices because experience has
shown that permitting experimentation and innovation is
the best way to provide for an improving and evolving
system of criminal justice administration. For us to rely
upon case law and sociological and physiological information which was current at the turn of the century to
curtail change is to ignore our need for improvement.
The day when we shall be satisfied to permit a juror to
hear evidence and then attempt to strike it from his mind
with a cautionary instruction is in the view of this writer,
rapidly coming to a close. It is abundently clear from the
tactics of trial counsel that a great deal of inadmissable
evidence is put before jurors with the knowledge that
cautionary instructions following a sustained objection
cannot entirely eradicate the impact of that evidence
upon the mind of the listener. Frankly, such a proposition is an unfounded and unwarranted legal fiction
which has an immense capacity to prejudice a Defendant on trial for his life.
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Utah cases on the admissibility of such evidence are
divided. The case of State v. Underwood, ______ U.2d ______ ,
______ , P.2d ------, helq that a conversation by the Defendant with an Officer in which Defendant alluded to the
fact that he was being investigated for other crimes was
admissible when it was a part of the res gestae of an
admissable statement made at the same time. On the
other band, in State v. Kazda, 14 U.2d 266, 382 P.2d
407, where an F.B.I. Officer testified that the Defendant was being investigated for a murder in the State of
Nebraska, was held so prejudicial as to render invalid
1.he yerdict. The Underwood case, supra, seems to have
been decided on the theory that there was other competent eYidence to sustain the verdict. In Kazda, the holding may have relied partially on the proposition that the
evidence was weak. In the instant case, all of the evidence is circumstantial; and it can certainly not be said
that any error, whether or not sufficient in itself to require reversal, did not have a prejudicial impact on a
jury faced with the most tenuous kind of circumstancial
evidence of guilt. The arguments of the District Attorney lend weight to that proposition in that they were
based on the cumulative effect of all of the evidence:
The state apparently acknowledging that no piece of
evidence by itself was sufficient to justify conviction.
Therefore, Appellant requests this court to reverse and
remand for new trial on the basis that the jury's knowledge of the prior conviction of this same crime by a prior
jury was so prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial.
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XII
THE EVIDENCE UPON vVHICH APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED IS CLEARLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT.
The fore going language, shopworn though it may
be from having graced the pages of most of the criminal
appeals filed in this court, is nevertheless urged upon the
court because it is especially applicable to this case. The
facts on which the statement is based are not "legal technicalities" or outright distortions of the obbvious, but
those adduced by the State of Utah at the trial of the
cause.
JTirst, a reading of the record will disclose that there
was no direct evidence whatever that Craig Sims committed this crime. The best that can be said for the State
is that it introduced evidence the vast majority of which
was contradicted, which if believed would permit a circumstantial inference of the guilt of the Defendant. The
most damning circumstantial evidence introduced was
so thoroughly rebutted that belief of the State's view of
the evidence would itself be an inference which could
not form the basis for a second inference on the ultimate
question of guilt. State v. Potello, -----·--·- ------------ -----·····
- --------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ·----------- ......................... . ............................ .
Capsulized, the circumstances shown by the State
which could at their best support an inference of guilt
were as follows:
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The State proved that Sims had been in the
apartment at which the murder occurred on the evening
of the crime, and knew that the victim would be there
alone for the rest of the night. He subsequently returned
there picked up his wallet, and left.
1.

The defense introduced uncontroverted testimony
that Sims had a valid reason for going there (other than
killing Linda Huntsman) and the purpose of his visit
was discussed; that he left the scene sometime prior to
11 :00 p.m. when the victim was still alive is uncontested.
The only evidence as to the time of death indicated that
the victim was still alive when Sims left the second time.
2. The State introduced testimony that the Sheriffs
office recovered samples of blood and semen in the murder room which bore type "A" international blood grouping characteristics. Sims has type A blood.

However, the State's experts acknowledged that
approximately 403 of all people have type A blood.
Such evidence is so prejudicial, yet so lacking in probative value, that its admissibility on the question of identity is apparently doubted by some leading writers.
The defense proved that the victims "boyfriend"
who also knew that the victim was there alone had the
same blood type. If that proof is of no consequence, then
the use 0f equfralent proof against Sims is equally inconsequencial.
3. Less than one percent of the total mass of foreign
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nylon and viscose fabric fibers found on Sims' levis, leri
jacket, and shorts were microscopically identical to fibers found, among others not found on Sims, to compr.se
the blanket on the bed in which the victim was found.
The defense established that such fibers are highly
common, mobile, and likely to be found in considerable
quantity on everyone, and that Sims had been in the
apartment containing the alleged source blanket the
night before h:s clothes were seized by the Sheriff. The
defense further established by uncontradicted testimony, that Sims touched and kissed Charlene Patterson
who had sat on the unmade bed on which the alleged
source blanket was found only thirty minutes before his
contact with her occurred. It was further proven, primarily out of the mouth of the states own witness that a
couch in Sims' home contained viscose fibers which were
also identical to those found in the blanket. What is left
is one minute nylon fiber, amongst thousands found on
his clothes, on each his levi jacket and his shorts which
matched the nylon fibers in the blanket. Again such
fibers were acknowledged to be common. The defense
introduced expert testimony, that identical nylon was
found in the lining of a coat worn by Sims' young son
the weekend before. It was further shown that Sims'
father conducted an upholstery business in his home involving many fabrics made of both viscose and nylon,
and that his home was full of such fibers.
4. In Sims' home the morning of the murder, a

Sheriff's deputy while on an illegal detour through
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Sims' bedroom, saw a black shirt on which he claims to
have seen ten or twelve hairs the same color as the victims. None of the other three officers then in the same
room saw any such thing.
5. On the outside leg of Sims' levis, the F.B.I.
found one spul of semen. The defense presented highly
credible testimony that Sims had had intercourse with a
young woman four nights before his arrest wearing
similar Levis which were not removed during their intimate relations.

It was established that Sims was at LDS Hospital
at 11 :00 on March 22, 1971, and there was testimony
that he arrived at 40th South and Highland Drive ( 20
minutes away) at 11:25 P.M. He remained there until
about I :20 a.m. and arrived home at I :25 a.m. where he
remained until he was aroused by the Sheriff.

Upon this speculative and wholly inadequate evidence, Loren Craig Sims was sentenced to spend the
rest of his life behind bars. Such a circumstance offends
every decency which our Constitution is designed to
sanctify. None of this evidence is subject to only one
legitimate inference. Most is subject to many which are
equally as reasonable as the inference of guilt.
Not only does this conviction fly in the face of the
general language of our State and Federal Constitutions· it also defies the law of this State as it was stated
'
to the jury in the Court's instruction No. 15:
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If the
in this case can be interpreied
or explained on any reasonable ground other
than the built of the Defendant, you must find
him not guilty.

This instruction is a clear and concise statement of
the law. See e.g., State v. Valenzuela, 425 P. 127
(Ariz.) and Reynolds v. State, 186 So.2d 315, (Fla.)
Appellant is aware of the legitimate reticence in
invading the fact-fmding province of the jury. However, the language of instruction No. 15 is so difficult
in light of the other instructions given on reasonable
doubt that this jury did not understand that they are required to acquit the Defendant if they find there is a
reasonable alternative explanation of all the evidence
consistent with his innocence, even though they might
believe he is guilty. It is the duty of this court in its supervisory role over the jury system to apply an objective
eye to the evidence and, in light of the law, determine
whether the jury abused its discretion as the finder of
fact.
All the evidence in this case can be "reasonably explained or interpreted" as follows; a construction every
bit if not more sensible than the speculation that Sims
committed the crime.
Sims went to the Patterson residence to take Mrs.
Patterson her hubcap. While searching for his cost receipt, he left his wallet in the den. He took Mrs. Patterson to work and noticed that his wallet was missing.
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He left the hospital about 11 :00, stopped by Pattersons, got his wallet from the boy, and met Arat the Sandpiper Lounge at 11 :25 P.M. He
stayed there until 1 :15 A.M. and got home at I :25 A.M.
where he stayed for the rest of the night. The Friday
before, he'd gone on a date with Elisa Snow. She cut her
toe and while examining the wound put it on the seat,
touching Sims' pantleg depositing one drop of blood.
Later that night they had intercourse during which a
spot of semen or two was deposited on Sims' clothing.
He picked up some yellow viscose fibers on his clothes
from his home over a period of a week. (His mother said
he'd sat on their yellow couch in his shorts that very
evening.) The two nylon fibers were accumulated in
bis home or rubbed off Mrs. Patterson when she kissed
him in the truck. While Sims was home in bed one of the
other 40% of all men who have type A blood killed
Linda Huntsman after 5 :00 in the morning when the
medical examiner said she was most likely killed.
The foregoing "interpretation and explanation" of
all the probative evidence in this case is not only "reasonable" but is more consistent with more evidence than
the inference of guilt. In fact, the State's theory requires
disbelief of considerable good credible testimony. (Note
time of death, alibi, accounting of time, etc.)
Given the foregoing, this court would appear to
have three alternatives: It may sustain the conviction by
declaring that the foregoing reasonable statement is unreasonable declare that the instructions of the Court are
'
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in error and remand for new trial consistent with new
instructions to be set forth by this court, or reverse for
insufficient evidence. Clearly, the last alternative is the
most "reasonable," and is the only one which insures
basic fairness to this Defendant.
A recent example of a court taking this course of
action in a case similar to this, is United States v. Corso,
439 F.2d 956. There, Defendant was convicted of burglary primarily on evidence that a matchbook found at
the scene of the crime and which had apparently been
used to hold a latch open bore Defendant's fingerprints.
In reversing, the court said:
The Defendant against Defendant was wholly
D::1cn,bnts iingerprinls ·were
discovered on an empty cover of a book of safety
matches w . .ici1 lrnd ueen folu.cd &ud used to jam
a lock assembly on a door leading from a lobby
to a stairwell in the building wherein the Credit
Union offices were located. Apparently the
matchbook cover was so placed as to prevent the
automatic locking of the door when closed.

circumsLu1.: a1.
0

*

*

*

*

Three witnesses testified that defendant made
credit purchases with cash down payments soon
after the burglary had occurred.

*

The most damaging evidence was the def endant's fingerprints found on the matchbook cover.
His fingerprints were not discovered elsewhere
on the premises, on the damaged safes,. desks. or
other articles in the Credit Union office which
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had been burglarized although some ten other
fingerprints of unidentified persons were there
s fingerprint expert
testified that it was impossible to determine how
long defendant's fingerprints had been on the
matchbook cover and admitted they could have
been placed there months before the burglary.
Thus, there was no direct evidence to show that
defendant's fingerprints were impressed upon
the. cover at the time of the burglary. The probative value of an accused fingerprints upon a
readily movable object is highly questionable,
unless it can be shown that such prints could
have been impressed only during the commission
of the crime.
This language is important both as to fact and law.
It indicates that courts can and do exercise an element
of supervisory control over juries and need not hesitate
to overturn unsound verdicts. Furthermore, the facts of
the case are very close to these in the instant case. The
evidence was all circumstantial and the court said that
since the most damning tangible evidence could not be
proven to have been placed at the scene by defendant at
the time the crime was committed, the verdict could not
stand. The language of that court applies equally to the
fiber evidence in this case. To paraphrase; the probative
value of "readily movable" and common fabric fibers on
Sims' clothes is highly questionable unless it can be
shown that they could have gotten there "only during
the commission of the crime." With all the reasonable
alternative theories available, such proof is impossible.
The verdict must therefore be reversed.
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XIII

THE INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL OF
THIS CASE DENIED DEFENDANT THE ,
l''UNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS TO WHICH
IlE IS ENTl'_fLED UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AlHENDlVIENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

During the course of the investigation and the trial
of this case, several pieces of evidence were introduced
and certain other irregularities occurred which have been
disapproved by courts under certain circumstances and '
which Appellant asserts have deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial. At the risk of appearing to be using
a "shotgun" approach, the following items are put forward for the courts' consideration in support of this
proposition.

A. The trial of this case was originally held during
August of 1972. At the trial, the state introduced evidence that the Defendant has type "A" blood. Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified that
blood and semen samples recovered from the room in
which the victim was found al_so possessed type "A" in- ,
ternational blood group characteristics. At that trial, an
objection to the testimony was sustained on the ground
that the Warrant under which defendants' blood had
been seized in the Salt Lake County Jail was insuf ficient. This claim was upheld by the Court, and the sample
1
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then in the possession of the state was declared inadmissable.
On .Motion of the State, Judge D. Frank Wilkins
declared that there was at that point in the trial, probable
cause sufficient to justify the seizure, and ordered the
Defendant to submit to a second sample of blood.
In the trial which commenced on November 1, 1971,
the result of the blood test performed upon the second
sample was admitted into evidence. (T. 399). The introduction of this evidence was error for two reasons.
First, the initial evidence was declared to have been
seized illegally. That decision was correct inasmuch as
the 'V arrant under which it was seized was not supported by an adequate affirmation of probable cause. The
blood sampie seized under this 'Varrant was declared
inadmissable. Appellant asserts that the curative measures ordered by the court after the illegality had already
occurred constituted an impermissible invasion of the
exclusionary rule set forth in Mapp v. Ohw, 367 U.S.
643, 6 L.Ed.2d. 1181, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961). It should
be clear that it is impermissable under our law to violate
the law, and then evade its strictures by undoing that
violation at a subsequent time, particularly where the
initial illegal use of the evidence seized has made its
value in the prosecution of a case clear.
Second, in alleging error in the admission of this
evidence Appellant relies upon Article I, Section 12, of
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the Constitution of Utah, wherein the following language is found:
The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself . . .
This language is significant in its relationship to
and distinction from the language of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which
provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Since the Constitution of the United States was in force at the time Article I Section 12 of
the Utah Constitution was drafted, it is apparent that
had the Fathers of our State desired to limit its restrictive language to testimonial evidence they could have
followed the example of the Fifth Amendment. However, the language used clearly demonstrates their intention to expand the protection against self-incrimination beyond testimony into the area of non-testimonial
evidence. Therefore, it follows that defendants' blood is
non-testimonial evidence which he cannot be compelled
to give against himself, under the language of Article I
Section 12 of the Constitution.
This interpretation of the language of the foregoing Section is supported by the Utah Supreme Court
in State vs. Sirrrwy, ---···-· ·····-····--···-······--··-·............... .
which is apparently one of the few cases in which this
constitutional language has been expounded. In that
case, Sirmay had been charged with committing a burglary. A footprint was found in soft earth under the
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window through which entry to the burglarized residence had been made. The police took a plaster cast of
the foot print and at trial Sirmay was required to fit
shoe into the casting for the purpose of identifying him
as the burglar.
The Utah Supreme Court overturned a verdict of
guilty in that case indicatmg that requiring Sirmay to
exhibit bodily traits for comparison with tangible evidence obtained by the PoLce violated Article I Section
12. There is no logical d1ctinction between the situation
in Sirmay and requiring Sims to give blood to be compared with physical evidence found at the scene of the
crime. Therefore, the language of Sinnay mandates a
reversal of the verdict of guilty and a remand for new
trial without permitting that evidence to be produced.
B. Further, rmfairness was imposed upon Sims in
this trial by the shoddy investigation by the Sa1t Lake
Cormty Sheriff's office. Of particular importance is the
fact that no effort was made to establish the time ot'
death of the victim. Testimony at trial indicated that
easy procedures are available to do so. The result of this
police inefficiency is that Sims was required, in order to
establish a reasonable doubt of his guilt, to provide an
alibi for himself from approximately 11 :00 p.m. on the
22nd of March, 1971, until 7:00 a.m. on the morning of
the 23rd. Failure to pinpoint the time of death so as to
afford the Defendant a reasonable opportunity to alibi
his actions at the time the offense was actually committed is deprivation of fairness which violates the Due
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in thal
it effectively required him to defend himself against
crimes committed all that night instead of the one that
was actually committed. In light of the cases which have
generally held that the jury must, when there is mere
than one possibility, agree on a single theory of the
crime. See, e.g., State vs. Thompson, 110 U.113, 170
P.2d. 153, 156. To permit one juror to believe that l:e
ccmmitted the crime at 5 :00 a.m. while permitting another to believe that he committed the same crime at
midnight is to admit the existence of a reasonable doubt
that he did it at all. '\Then a man's life is at stake and the
verdict rests on such shoddy and circumstantial evidence
as that presented in this case such a circumstance cannot
fairly be permitted to stand.
C. The Defendant was irremediately prejudiced by
two elements of the testimony of Robert Yockey which
commences at page 499 of the trial transcript and runs
through page 573, excluding considerable argument in
chambers.
The first error was in the introduction of the testimony of this witness at all. Appellant urges a careful
reading of the rather brief direct testimony of this witness from page 532 through page 536 of the trial transcript. This testimony constitutes what the witness swore
was the substance of a conversation alleged to have
taken place between he and the Defendant during October of 1971. A comparison of this statement to the
bulk of the witness's testimony on cross-examination
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makes it obvious that the witness launched into a false
and ficticious embellishment of the facts he stated on
direct and purportedly gave to the District Attorney
which t110ugh large1y absuru, vvas immensely preJud1cial.
Yockey testified that Sims told him that he committed the crime when he returned to the apartment to
get his wallet. When he rang the bell, the boy answered
and called the victim from the other room. He struck the
baby sitter in the head, knocking her unconcious, and
then proceeded to carry her to the bedroom where he
raped and strangled her. The testimony of the boy contained no element of such a story, but simply said that
Sims came back, asked for his wallet, and left. On Crossexamination, Yockey commenced to state details about
what Sims told him about leaving a wallet at the Patterson apartment which did not comport with the testimony
of Gerald Patterson. (T. 566). He changed his testimony from a statement that Sims told him the girl was
wearing a nightgown to a statement that Sims said she
was wearing a pair of pajamas and a robe. (T. 558-68).
He said that Sims told him that he struck the girl in the
head twice, once in the livingroom and once in the bedroom and that he had grabbed her by the neck and
choked her. (T. 565) The medical examiner said that
she was not choked with a hand and that she had only
one bruise on her head consistent with a blow. Yockey
said Sims told him that he pulled the robe back over her
when he raped her; the evidence clearly show107

ing that there was no robe found in the room at all (T.
568). Yockey finally testified at page 573 that the story
he had told on the stand, including the details which he
fabricated on cross-examination were precisely what he
told .Mr.Jay Edmonds of the District Attorneys office
prior to the trial. ( T. 573) ..Mr. Edmonds' statement of
what Yockey told him omitted almost all of the details
to which Yockey testified on cross-examination. (T.
591-595).

In addition to the obvious inconsistencies in this
story, the District Attorney's office had had a similar
experience with the same witness when he testified
against this same defendant in criminal No. 2314 in the
District Court of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and Supreme
Court No. 12966 charging Appellant with rape, which
case is presently in Appeal in this court. The pattern of
the testimony of this witness was almost identical. On direct examination he gave a straightforward statement of
the substance of an alleged confession, then proceeded
to elaborate and obviously fabricate details under crossexamination. Again, almost all such details were proven
to be patently false as fact and most unlikely to be related by a Defendant who had actually committed the
crime.
Appellant asserts that the prosecuting authority in
a criminal matter has some duty to determine that the
evidence which he produces at trial is at least colorably
credible. With the prior experience of the District Attorney in the rape which incidently was heard by the
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same Judge that heard the instant case, it is clear that
the District Attorney had to have had more than areasonable doubt about the credibility of the statements of
this witness. Given a large doubt about the veracity of
any of what the witness said, he should not have called
this witness to testify. A further problem as to the credibility of the witness is raised by the obvious belief which
he harbored that he would be given some preferencial
treatment on the crimes which he was charged with.
This is not to say that the District Attorney would stoop
to making ilicit deals with the witness in exchange for
his testimony, but the record will support the inference
that even though not true, the witness believed that if he
testified against Sims such consideration would be given.
The attention of the Court is called to United
States v. Palisi, 416 F.2d 573 (CA 2 1970) where the
following language was used:
Where a conviction is shown to be based even
in part upon perjured testimony, the
will
not stop to inquire as to the precise effect of
perjury, but will order a new trial if without the
perjury the jury might not have convicted or
the Trial Court might not have sentenced so
heavily. (Emphasis added).
The record makes it abundantly clear that large
portions of Yockey's testimony were perjured. This conviction which obviously may have been "based even in
part upon perjured testimony" must be reversed.
In anticipation of the arguments of the Respondent
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in this case, two statements ought to be made. One is that
despite the effect of the cross-examination which to any
objective reader must have been sufficient to indicate
that the witness was lying, the effect of an alleged conf e.ss10n in any trial cannot be understated. Where a case
jg based wholly on circumstantial evidence, and where
that evidence is all subject to opposing reasonable inferences, the effect of this alleged confession upon a
juror not sure which way to turn is bound to prejudice
that juror toward a vote of guilty. Furthermore, the
State will likely argue that it has the perogative if not
the duty of putting all available evidence before the jury
for its consideration rather than making a judgment on
its own that evidence ought not to be heard. In response,
it can only be said thatwhere the evidence is as highly inflamatory and prejudicial as this, going to the very heart
of many criminal convictions such a point of view is
of prosecutorial discretion and responsibility. Permitting this testimony to be introduced at trial is reversable error.
D. Appellant was further prejudiced by the gencr::dly shoddy investigation of this crime. Mention has
already been made of the Sheriff's Office to take any
steps whatsoever to establish the time of death of the
victim. Additional failures in investigation which could
likely have lead either to a more sure conviction or to
prove that he was innocent of the charge include the following. Testimony at trial indicated that in typing body
fluids, including both blood and sperm, there are a great
many minor blood factors which can be tested to deter110
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mine whether or not one sample of blood is the same as
another. The F.B.l. witness Beams testified that such
testing could have excluded a great proportion of the
persons with Type A blood as the killer of Linda Huntsman. ( T. 441) Failure to undertake such simple steps in
an effort to determine the identity of the real perpetrator
of a crime is an atrocious invasion of the rights of the
citizens of this country, particularly when such steps can
be taken with little or no expense. A determination that
the blood found at the scene was different from the blood
seized from Sims as to "RH" or "MM" blood groups
would have excluded him as the killer. Failure to take
such steps cannot be tolerated.
Furthermore, there was testimony at the first trial
of this case that a man in white clothing was seen by a
witness outside the door of the apartment wherein the
murder was committed at a time when the crime could
have been taking place. In the trial of this case, the Chief
of Detective Hayward did not even acknowledge that
he had even heard about this testimony, or other testimony that a man dressed in white had been seen in the
parking lot of the apartment house where the crime
occurred the evening before. (T. 792-295) Such obvious
failures in the investigation of this crime indicate that
rather than vigorously investigating the crime, the
Sheriff's office took the path of least resistence, "hung
the crime" on a ready suspect on shoddy evidence, and
omitted to investigate leads which could have well excluded him as the perpetrator of the crime.
Ill

In a case as weak as this, the foregoing problems
contribute significantly to the denial of due process and
fundamental fairness which surrounds this case. For
these additional reasons the conviction should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, counsel respectfully submits
that the case should either be dismissed, or reversed and
remanded for a new trial consistent with holdings of this
court.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES N. BARBER
455 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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